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# Impact Evaluation of Participatory Budgeting in Ukraine

Dmytro Khutkyy, Kristina Avramchenko



## Reference

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## Acknowledgements

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Serhii Karelin, E-democracy Component Coordinator, the Swiss-Ukrainian program E-Governance for Accountability and Participation (EGAP)

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### Proofreading

Orysia Hrudka

### Design

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### Funding

This research has been conducted with the support of the Open Society Foundations.

*All thoughts, conclusions and recommendations belong to the authors of this publication and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the project donor.*

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## Summary

Participatory budgeting as a mechanism of direct citizen participation in decision making on the use of public funds is globally acknowledged good practice of participatory governance. In Ukraine, within almost four years—from August 2015 till May 2019—participatory budgeting has been introduced in at least 154 communities. However, the available estimations of its efficiency are fragmented. Therefore, the goal of this research is to evaluate the impact of participatory budgeting on a community: its quality of life, residents, and local self-governance.

For this aim, desk research was performed, the collection of data from open sources was carried out, information requests were sent to local self-government agencies, and expert interviews were conducted. Largely, this research relies on the received official responses from 141 local self-government agencies, 23 semi-structured interviews with public officials and civic activists, and on 9 case studies. The legal analysis of regulations, the statistical analysis of quantitative data, and the content analysis of qualitative data was applied to this data.

It was found that while each year new communities introduce participatory budgeting, the peak was in 2017, and since 2018 the pace of introducing participatory budgeting in new communities has slowed down. The communities implementing participatory budgeting reveal a trend of lengthening of the participatory budgeting cycle: on average, the third cycle is longer than the first one by 3 months.

In 2015-2018, on average, communities spent 0.4-0.5% of all community funds on participatory budgeting. At the same time, each year communities allocate for participatory budgeting 52.8% more funds on average than in the previous year. Similarly, actual expenditures on participatory budgeting grew on average 50.1% annually.

Aiming to inform the public about participatory budgeting local self-government agencies utilized from 2 to 6 communication channels, 4 on average. Yet, just 13 of these agencies (9.2% of the total number of communities which have provided answers for information requests) informed that they fund respective communication campaigns.

In all participatory budgeting cycles, project authors were predominantly female. In the first two cycles, the median share of female authors comprised about 63%, and in the third and the fourth cycles—58% and 59.5% respectively. While the right to submit projects is usually limited to persons aged 18 years and older, in some communities—from the age of 16 or even 14.

The dynamics of the number of submitted projects, the share of projects put for voting, and the share of winning projects vary among communities. On average, every third or fourth project wins. The majority of communities successfully complete participatory budgeting projects. The average value of the share of completed participatory budgeting projects was 89.5% in the first cycle and 88.2% in the second one.

As to the voting democraticness, in 134 communities (98.5% of the total number of communities with available data), participatory budgeting projects for realization are defined by a binding popular vote—a design of direct democracy. Although the mixed paper-electronic voting remains predominant (in around 2/3 of communities), time dynamics demonstrates a trend of voting digitization. The voting share is rather volatile because its values vary from 0.2% to 43.9%. While the right to vote usually belongs to persons aged 18 years and older, some communities allow the youth from 16 or even 14 to vote for participatory budgeting projects.

Concerning the factors of civic participation, the hypothesis about the influence of the share of participatory budgeting funding of the total community budget, the number of full participatory budgeting cycles, and the share of completed projects in the previous cycle on the number of voters have not been confirmed by the regression analysis.

Albeit, the case studies revealed that the trajectory of the participatory budgeting development largely depends on civic activism and the local self-government transparency. If locals uphold the democratic format of participation and local authorities are open to a productive dialogue and experiments, they adopt democratic regulations on participatory budgeting developed together with the public, efficient citizens-authorities collaboration is established. Locals submit high-quality projects, vote in mass, monitor project realization, while authorities carefully examine projects, transparently cover the entire process, and realize projects responsibly. The quality of life in a community increases, the public becomes more active, and self-governance becomes more efficient.

The report is structured as follows. The introduction describes the national context, the impact model and the research methodology. The second chapter uncovers the tendencies and factors of participatory budgeting impact in Ukraine. The third chapter presents case studies in the country. At the end, conclusions and recommendations are presented.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 National context

The post-revolution wave of 2014-2015 nation-wide reforms in Ukraine continued on the local scale, in particular in the format of participatory budgeting (further–PB). Unlike state-wide centralized reforms, the introduction of citizen engagement initiatives for community development rests with each local self-government (further–LSG). Thereby, the spread of effort-intensive PB all over the country indicates an extraordinary success of this participatory governance format.

Although **PB originated** in Porto Alegre, Brazil back in 1989<sup>1</sup> and in the 1990s it was practiced in South America, only from 2000s civic activists and international organizations started the massive introduction of PB in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Northern America.<sup>2</sup> In Ukraine, PB has been systematically promoted with Polish experience by the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI (further–PAUCI), at least, since March 2015.<sup>3</sup>

According to the obtained data, the first cities to **introduce PB in Ukraine** as legal regulations in August 2015 were Cherkasy and Chernihiv. By the end of 2015, PB regulations were adopted at least in 4 cities, by the end of 2016—at least in 47 LSGs. Open sources demonstrate that as of 19 July 2019, PB has been introduced in at least 154 LSGs.

Also, on 11 November 2018, Ukraine Parliament has adopted the funding for winning projects of the **Nationwide Participatory Budgeting**.<sup>4</sup> However, because of too short terms, the government has not developed a genuinely nation-wide PB (to support projects of county scale). In practice, the first year of introduction (2019 fiscal year) adopted a transitional design: public funds will be used for PB projects of oblast and inter-oblast scale, as well as within the framework of the sectoral support by the European Union.<sup>5</sup>

Such rapid dissemination of PB has several **causes**: the readiness of civic activists and local authorities for collaboration and experimenting, the availability of successful cases, the circulation of information, applied training, technical and financial support. Indeed, local activists might strive to become more empowered for participation in public policy and community development, while local authorities might value the advantages of engaging citizens into the allocation of the local budget. In particular, the benefits might include attracting investments for community development, sharing responsibilities with local residents, raising popularity of politicians, etc.

Sometimes, **a third party** can initiate a change. In this way, PAUCI has been conducting PB training at

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1 Participatory Budgeting. (2019, August 26) In Participedia. Retrieved from: <https://participedia.net/method/146>

2 Baiocchi, G. & Ganuza, E. (2014). Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered. *Politics & Society*, 42, 29-50. doi: 10.1177/0032329213512978

3 PAUCI. (2015, March 7). Partytsypatorne biudzhetuвання: Innovatsiyni demokratychnyi instrument uchasti hromadian [Participatory budgeting: An innovative democratic instrument of civic participation]. Retrieved from: <https://pauci.org/ua/news/46>

4 Proekt Zakonu pro Derzhavnyi biudzheth Ukrayiny na 2019 rik [Draft Law on the State Budget of Ukraine 2019]. Retrieved from: [http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4\\_1?pf3511=64598](http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=64598)

5 Government portal. Official website. (2019, April 3). Na realizatsiyu proektiv Vseukrayinskoho hromadskoho biudzhetu peredbacheno 500 mln hrn, - Hennadii Zubko [500 mln UAH is allocated to implement the All-Ukrainian participatory budgeting–Hennadii Zubko]. Retrieved from: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/news/na-realizaciyu-proektiv-vseukrayinskogo-gromadskogo-byudzhetu-peredbacheno-500-mln-grn-gennadij-zubko>

least since April 2015,<sup>6</sup> organizing fora of participation practitioners since 2016,<sup>7</sup> developing PB in 8 cities, and supporting information campaigns.<sup>8</sup> The Swiss-Ukrainian program E-Governance for Accountability and Participation (further–EGAP) is developing PB in 4 priority oblasts, conducting civic education on country scale,<sup>9</sup> provides local communities with a free access to the online-service “Community budget” (according to the platform data, 86 communities are using it<sup>10</sup>). SocialBoost provides free access to the online-platform “Community project” to 51 communities.<sup>11</sup> Since 2016, the Institute for Budgetary and Socio-Economic Research, in partnership with SocialBoost and 4 regional NGOs, has provided methodological, technical, and promotional support for PB development to 48 urban communities.<sup>12</sup> Since 2017, the Center for Innovations Development (further–CID) has published a series of analytical inquiries and recommendations for PB introduction,<sup>13</sup> in 2018, consulted 12 cities for the introduction of the “Community Model of PB,” and held a thematic workshop for 5 cities.<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, the last years have united researchers, practitioners, and sympathizers of PB into an integrated **ecosystem**. Beyond informal cooperation networks, there is an intensive exchange of experience and news in Facebook-groups “Community budget / Participatory budget”<sup>15</sup> (over 1,900 members) and “The community budget of Kyiv: Together”<sup>16</sup> (over 11,000 members).

## 1.2 Impact model

Before examining PB, it is reasonable to define it as a concept. According to one definition, **participatory budgeting** is a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources.<sup>17</sup> Apart from deliberation and decision-making which are essential for PB local residents can participate in the implementation or monitoring of projects. It should be emphasized that this is not the delegation of authority but direct citizen participation. Therefore, PB is an instrument of direct democracy.

The PB **implementation mechanism** varies. For example, the two biggest e-voting online platforms for PB projects in Ukraine<sup>18,19</sup> outline 5 core stages: (1) (project) submission; (2) project review (and update); (3) voting (for projects); (4) defining/announcing winners; (5) (planning and) realization (of projects). Yet, this is only a part of a wider set of activities.

- 6 PAUCI. (2015, April 6). Mistsevi posadovtsi opanovuyut' metodolohiyu partytsypatornoho biudzhetuвання [Local officials master the participatory budgeting methodology]. Retrieved from: <https://pauci.org/ua/news/47>
- 7 PAUCI. (2016, December 6). Koly mistom keruyut' meshkantsi [When residents govern a city]. Retrieved from: <https://www.pauci.org/news/159>
- 8 PAUCI. (2019, January 18). Hromadskyi biudzheth na shliakhu do vidkrytosti: Pidsumky pidtrymky u desiaty hromadah 2016-2018 [Participatory budgeting on its way to openness: The results of support in ten communities during 2016-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://pauci.org/ua/news/315>
- 9 EGAP. (n.d.). E-Democracy. Retrieved from: <https://egap.in.ua/en/component/e-democracy/>
- 10 EGAP. (n.d.). Hromadskyi biudjet [Community budget]. Retrieved from: <https://budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/>
- 11 SocialBoost. (n.d.). Hromadskyi proekt [Community project]. Retrieved from: <https://pb.org.ua/en>
- 12 IBSER. (n.d.). Citizen's Project. Retrieved from: <https://www.ibser.org.ua/gromadskyy-proekt>
- 13 Center for Innovations Development. (n.d.). Analitika [Analytics]. Retrieved from: <https://cid.center/category/analytics/>
- 14 Center for Innovations Development. (2018, October 22). Hromadska model' biudzhetu uchasti zakhopliuye mista Ukrainy [The community model of participatory budgeting is permeating Ukraine's cities]. Retrieved from: <https://cid.center/345677654-2/?fbclid=IwAR2jaOcAsScAMvGx3P6VZUCuMfwTx7mzqlC9q-HY7PvRNqEUvgLpUT2bScY>
- 15 Facebook. (n.d.). Hromadskyi biudzheth [Community budget]/ Participatory budget. Retrieved from: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1580110595644887/>
- 16 Facebook. (n.d.). Hromadskyi biudzheth Kyieva: SPILNO [The community budget of Kyiv: Together]. Retrieved from: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/public.budget.Kyiv.SPILNO/>
- 17 Wampler, B. (2007). A Guide to Participatory Budgeting. In A. Shah (Ed.), *Participatory Budgeting* (pp. 21-54). Washington, DC: IBRD / WB. Retrieved from: <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf>
- 18 EGAP. (n.d.). Hromadskyi biudjet [Community budget]. Retrieved from: <https://budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/>
- 19 SocialBoost. (n.d.). Hromadskyi proekt [Community project]. Retrieved from: <https://pb.org.ua/en>



The publication by CID uncovers a more exhaustive list of recommended PB stages: (1) the adoption of parameters and timetables; (2) the establishment of working agencies and an appeal body; (3) informational-educational campaign; (4) the creation of teams and the elaboration of projects; (5) the check and the publishing of projects, and the collection of support votes; (6) conducting an expertise, the appealing of the expertise results, a public discussion and the forming of projects put for voting; (7) voting for projects, defining winning projects; (8) planning the realization of PB projects; (9) realization and reporting; (10) the evaluation of the implemented PB cycle and the perfection of its mechanism.<sup>20</sup>

It should be admitted that the preparation and the submission of projects by self-nominated authors assumes that a community should have leaders (project authors and team members) emerged who will offer projects useful for the community as a whole. However, in such a design, the **agenda** of changes in the community is defined according to individual preferences and during voting local residents have to choose among solutions suggested by the leaders. Such PB model can be described as “*social-entrepreneurship*,” whereas the leaders act as social entrepreneurs who put forward own initiatives for a community and compete for the support of its residents.

Although in fact, the original PB model implemented in Porto Alegre, New York, Chicago, and many other cities, is fundamentally different. It requires lengthy **deliberation** of community development priorities and the choice of specific projects based on the jointly defined community priorities which are then transferred to local authorities.<sup>21</sup> Such PB model can be named as “*deliberative*” because a community in the spirit of deliberative democracy forms a strategic agenda for community changes and chooses projects for its enactment.

In a sense, “*consensus*” model of choosing projects is a compromise. It’s central idea is that projects are shaped at the meetings of locals and officials by consensus. Only if an agreement has not been achieved, a voting for projects is conducted. Yet, there is a risk that officials might influence the PB agenda.

The **voting** format for PB projects also has multiple variations. In the least democratic version, local officials choose projects. This is an element of the so-called “bureaucratic model”.<sup>22</sup> It is not PB in the strict sense, despite being called so. In a democratic version, citizens choose local development projects by a binding voting. In the most democratic version, locals develop a local development strategy.

Concerning voting formats, it might be paper or electronic. Electronic voting can be delivered either in centers for administrative services (further–CASs) or directly at an online platform. To identify a person during an electronic voting, a variety of mechanisms can be used: an email or a social media profile (the least reliable identification method); a scanned and uploaded to an online system passport (also not very reliable identification method); an electronic digital signature (further–EDS), BankID, or ID-card (reliable identification methods). Supposedly, the stricter an identification method is, the more reliable is an identification, but the less numerous is popular participation, and vice versa.

Chosen projects can be **realized** by LSGs, locals, or partly by LSGs and partly by locals. In the classic design, locals choose projects, while local authorities realize them. Still, the idea of co-implementation or even a complete implementation of projects by their authors or other activists is absolutely in the

20 Center for Innovations Development. (2018, October 22). Hromadska model' biudzhetu uchasti zakhopliuye mista Ukrainy [The community model of participatory budgeting is permeating Ukraine's cities]. Retrieved from: <https://cid.center/345677654-2/?fbclid=IwAR2jaOcAsScAMvGx3P6VZUCuMfwTx7mzqlC9q-HY7PvRNgeUvgLpUT2bscY>

21 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

22 Center for Innovations Development. (2018, February 25). Stan vprovadzhennia hromadskoho biudzhetu (biudzhetu uchasti) u mistah Ukrainy [The state of participatory budgeting introduction in Ukraine's cities]. Retrieved from: <https://cid.center/1059250720-2/>

spirit of participatory democracy. Perhaps, the (co)implementation of projects by their authors or locals is realistic for small-scale or unique projects requiring a precise design embodiment. On the contrary, if projects are large-scale or standard, it is reasonable to delegate their realization to local authorities.

The **monitoring and control** of project realization and the accountability of implementers are important too. In communities with a strong civil society, even informal control might have an effect. Still, it is better if the right for a civic oversight is legally inscribed in a respective regulation and there are clear mechanisms of its enactment. On the other side, LSGs must ensure process transparency, regularly report on realizing projects, and bear responsibility in the case of non-realization.

The presupposed **PB impact model** is complex, therefore, it is reasonable to cluster the primary impact parameters into several domains: the quality of life, local residents, and the local self-governance. Literature review about the lessons of PB introduction in different countries, including Ukraine, allows describing the theoretically plausible or empirically verified PB effects. They will serve as research hypotheses. The complete model of possible PB effects and the respective hypotheses are presented in Appendix 1.

Concerning the **PB impact on the quality of life** of community residents, PB introduction can raise it in multiple spheres.<sup>23</sup> PB significantly improves the provision and the administration of basic public services, such as water supply, water extraction, sanitation, waste disposal, public transport, roads, electricity, and energy.<sup>24</sup> For convenience of analyzing the impact of PB on the quality of life in Ukraine, the project classification utilized by the online-platform “Community project”<sup>25</sup> was applied. The reason behind this choice is that this platform automatically presents project type statistics. Thereby, the quality of life can improve in the following spheres: (1) security; (2) utilities; (3) roads, transport; (4) environment; (5) culture, tourism; (6) sports; (7) public health; (8) social security; (9) education; (10) information technologies; (11) civil society; (12) public space; (13) other.

Regarding the **PB impact on local residents**, there are the following effects.

Community activism increases. People become more motivated to join community activities, they are more involved into community life, and the degree of cooperation among locals increases.<sup>26</sup> Also, new community leaders emerge and citizens unite for the benefit of common projects.<sup>27</sup>

Simultaneously, one can observe an increase in participation inclusiveness. The inclusiveness of diverse social groups (in particular, people with low income and low education, the elderly, the retired, the unemployed, and the working class), including politically marginalized social groups (the less well-off, the elderly, and ethnic minorities), to community life increases.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, PB provides all social strata a real opportunity for a public discussion of proposals with the authorities.<sup>29</sup>

23 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

24 Cabannes, Y. (2015). The impact of participatory budgeting on basic services: municipal practices and evidence from the field. *Environment & Urbanization*, 27, 257-284. doi: 10.1177/0956247815572297

25 SocialBoost. (n.d.). Hromadskyi proekt [Community project]. Retrieved from: <https://pb.org.ua/en>

26 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

27 Ploskyi, K. (2016). Analitichnyi zvit “Partitsipatornyi biudzhet” [Analytical report “Participatory budgeting”]. Kyiv: PLEDDG. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory\\_Budget\\_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpfUczlD9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROpQtWWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g](https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory_Budget_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpfUczlD9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROpQtWWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g)

28 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

29 Baiocchi, G. & Ganuza, E. (2014). Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered. *Politics & Society*, 42, 29-50. doi: 10.1177/0032329213512978

Civic education is conducted. People develop a better understanding of local governance and improve their civic participation skills.<sup>30</sup> According to the PAUCI survey in 10 Ukraine's communities with PB, during 2016-2018 project authors improved the understanding of budget process and gained new project management skills.<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, citizens are empowered. Decision-making is decentralized, residents are represented in local authorities and elect PB representatives to local authorities.<sup>32</sup> The possibility to influence authorities empowers citizens.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, PB in Ukraine empowers citizens by engaging them in all stages of policy making.<sup>34</sup>

Social cohesion increases. PB enhances community-building, people enjoy positive sense of belonging to their community as a coherent social entity.<sup>35</sup>

Concerning the PB **impact on local self-governance**, there are multiple effects too.

There are changes in the capacities of local officials. In particular, there are positive changes in politicians' conscience.<sup>36</sup> According to the PAUCI survey, in 10 Ukraine's communities with PB, during 2016-2018 the participation of local officials in implementing PB improved their professional skills in communication and public administration.<sup>37</sup>

The interaction between the public and the authorities improves. The level of mutual understanding between citizens and authorities increases, the collaboration between them strengthens and becomes more efficient.<sup>38</sup> Also, the barriers between local residents and municipalities are being overcome.<sup>39</sup> The balance of power shifts from individual bureaucrats to all stakeholders.<sup>40</sup> The interaction between the authorities and the civil society becomes more democratic.<sup>41</sup> According to the PAUCI survey in 10 Ukraine's communities with PB, during 2016-2018 in the majority of communities PB became an efficient and productive instrument of communication between authorities and communities; in turn, there mutual trust

30 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

31 PAUCI. (2019, January 18). Hromadskyi biudzheth na shliakhu do vidkrytosti: Pidsumky pidtrymky u desiaty hromadah 2016-2018 [Participatory budgeting on its way to openness: The results of support in ten communities during 2016-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://pauci.org/ua/news/315>

32 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

33 Baiocchi, G. & Ganuza, E. (2014). Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered. *Politics & Society*, 42, 29-50. doi: 10.1177/0032329213512978

34 Khutkyy, D. (2019). Electronic Democracy in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. *Patterns and Comparative Perspectives. Südos-teuropa. Journal of Politics and Society*, 67, 264-284. doi: 10.1515/soeu-2019-0017

35 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

36 Ploskyi, K. (2016). Analitychnyi zvit "Partitsipatornyi biudzheth" [Analytical report "Participatory budgeting"]. Kyiv: PLEDDG. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory\\_Budget\\_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g](https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory_Budget_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g)

37 PAUCI. (2019, January 18). Hromadskyi biudzheth na shliakhu do vidkrytosti: Pidsumky pidtrymky u desiaty hromadah 2016-2018 [Participatory budgeting on its way to openness: The results of support in ten communities during 2016-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://pauci.org/ua/news/315>

38 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

39 Ploskyi, K. (2016). Analitychnyi zvit "Partitsipatornyi biudzheth" [Analytical report "Participatory budgeting"]. Kyiv: PLEDDG. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory\\_Budget\\_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g](https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory_Budget_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g)

40 Wampler, B. (2007). A Guide to Participatory Budgeting. In A. Shah (Ed.), *Participatory Budgeting* (pp. 21-54). Washington, DC: IBRD / WB. Retrieved from: <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf>

41 Baiocchi, G. & Ganuza, E. (2014). Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered. *Politics & Society*, 42, 29-50. doi: 10.1177/0032329213512978

between the locals and the authorities has increased.<sup>42</sup> Also, according to an expert survey of local officials and civic activists, conducted by CID together with the Association of Open Cities in July-August 2017, PB was acknowledged as one of the most efficient e-services of collaboration between citizens and authorities in Ukraine.<sup>43</sup>

The quality of democracy increases. The scale and sphere of civic participation expand, democratic decisions are directly delivered to authorities, democratic procedures become more transparent, and social justice increases.<sup>44</sup> Overall, civil society advances.<sup>45</sup> In Ukraine, the participation scale varies. According to the 2018 Index of local electronic democracy by CID, in Kyiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, and Khmelnytskyi the number of PB users was lower compared to some other e-participation instruments, although in Cherkasy the number of PB users outnumbered all other e-democracy forms by over 14 times.<sup>46</sup> According to the PAUCI data, from 2017 to 2018, the 10 studied communities in the East of Ukraine, PB funding, the number of submitted projects, the number of projects chosen for realization, and the number of residents who voted for these projects have increased.<sup>47</sup>

The quality of local self-governance improves. Though the municipality bore new responsibilities, there are positive changes in the modes of operation of the municipality, particularly due to the process transparency and civic oversight.<sup>48</sup> PB encourages officials to reform local administration, both procedurally and organizationally.<sup>49</sup>

Local self-governance becomes more efficient. Despite substantial expenditures for the PB process in the forms of financial resources, time, and the active participation of all stakeholders, public funds are allocated according to social needs.<sup>50</sup> There is also an increase in social equity and social justice because lower-income neighborhoods receive more municipal resources; due to increased transparency and reduced corruption, public funds are used effectively.<sup>51</sup>

The world practice of PB brings evidence that civic activism increases over time, especially after the third year of implementation; this is because citizens acknowledge a direct connection between their

42 PAUCI. (2019, January 18). Hromadskyi biudzheth na shliakhu do vidkrytosti: Pidsumky pidtrymky u desiaty hromadah 2016-2018 [Participatory budgeting on its way to openness: The results of support in ten communities during 2016-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://pauci.org/ua/news/315>

43 Tomkova, J., Khutkyy, D., & Nakhod, M. (2018). Policy Briefs on Good E-Governance. Issue #3: Local E-democracy: Current Developments. Kyiv: EGAP / CID. Retrieved from: <https://egap.in.ua/biblioteka/analitichni-zapysky-z-efetyvnoho-e-uriaduvannia-vypusk-3/>

44 Khutkyy, D. (2017, October 31). Participatory budgeting: An empowering democratic institution. Eurozine. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurozine.com/participatory-budgeting-an-empowering-democratic-institution/>

45 Ploskyi, K. (2016). Analitichnyi zvit "Partitsipatornyi biudzheth" [Analytical report "Participatory budgeting"]. Kyiv: PLEDDG. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory\\_Budget\\_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g](https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory_Budget_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g)

46 Loboyko, S., Khutkyy, D., & Iemelianova, A. (Eds.). (2018). Indeks mistsevoyi elektronnoyi demokratiyi v Ukrayini: pilotne doslidzhennia [The Index of Local Electronic Democracy in Ukraine: A Pilot Study]. Kyiv: CID. Retrieved from: <http://cid.center/index.php/987520954/>

47 PAUCI. (2019). Hromadskyi biudzheth na Shodi Ukrayiny-intehratsiya zarady rozvytku [Participatory budgeting in the East of Ukraine-integration for development]. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/integration\\_for\\_development.pdf](https://pauci.org/upload/files/integration_for_development.pdf)

48 Ploskyi, K. (2016). Analitichnyi zvit "Partitsipatornyi biudzheth" [Analytical report "Participatory budgeting"]. Kyiv: PLEDDG. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory\\_Budget\\_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g](https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory_Budget_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g)

49 Wampler, B. (2007). A Guide to Participatory Budgeting. In A. Shah (Ed.), *Participatory Budgeting* (pp. 21-54). Washington, DC: IBRD / WB. Retrieved from: <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf>

50 Ploskyi, K. (2016). Analitichnyi zvit "Partitsipatornyi biudzheth" [Analytical report "Participatory budgeting"]. Kyiv: PLEDDG. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory\\_Budget\\_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g](https://pauci.org/upload/files/Participatory_Budget_Dec2016.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1zJOzpFUczID9GZWKo-ZlqF4mTAo3jROPQtVWblyXjBX7ak47GP9e4kd2g)

51 Wampler, B. (2007). A Guide to Participatory Budgeting. In A. Shah (Ed.), *Participatory Budgeting* (pp. 21-54). Washington, DC: IBRD / WB. Retrieved from: <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf>

participation and policy making; participation grows faster if authorities invest resources in PB; overall, programs that had endured for more than five years have spawned **important changes**.<sup>52</sup> Thereby, the share of those who voted for PB projects—this is one of the key and measurable indicators of PB impact—can be affected by PB duration, the scope of funding, and the share of realized projects. These hypotheses will be tested in this research.

## 1.3 Research methodology

For the study of PB impact, a set of **quantitative and qualitative research methods** was applied.

At first, during March-May 2019 a **desk research** was performed. It reviewed inquiries about PB impact published by international and Ukrainian scholars. Due to this, a conceptual model of PB impact was developed, research hypotheses were defined, and research methodology was updated.

**Data collection from open sources** has followed. At this stage, communities that reported PB introduction were identified and added to a list. Communities were searched, in particular, on platforms with the highest number of registered PB communities in Ukraine—“Community budget”<sup>53</sup> and “Community project.”<sup>54</sup> Besides, internet search engines were utilized to find other communities that employed alternative or their own online-platforms or published online news about PB introduction. Thereby, 155 communities that reportedly introduced PB were identified.<sup>55</sup>

Afterward, two researchers sent via email two independent **information requests to LSGs** of each identified community, requesting public information (the requests are cited in Appendix 2). The information requests to provide statistical information about PB introduction in a community were sent on 31 May 2019. The information requests to provide legal PB regulations were sent on 3 June 2019. In case of specification of information controllers contact details, some information requests were sent later—till 27 June 2019.

In the case of Zelenodolsk city, even though the website informed about the presence of PB,<sup>56</sup> the official response from the municipality informed that the introduction of PB is only being reviewed. This is why in this research the actual number of identified communities that have introduced PB in Ukraine by the end of May 2019 comprises 154 communities (the list of these communities with links to respective websites is provided in Appendix 3).

Taking into consideration the time provisioned by the law<sup>57</sup> and extra time, required to respond to updated information requests, **answers to information requests** (via email and via regular mail alike) were received from LSGs by 19 July 2019. During this period, 136 (89.3%) of the 154 LSGs that reportedly introduced PB, provided copies of requested legal acts. Answers to information requests for statistical data were provided by 141 LSGs (91.6%). Other 13 LSGs either answered more than 2 months after the information requests or have not answered at all. Moreover, as many as 130 (92.2%) of 141 answers con-

52 Wampler, B. (2007). A Guide to Participatory Budgeting. In A. Shah (Ed.), *Participatory Budgeting* (pp. 21-54). Washington, DC: IBRD / WB. Retrieved from: <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf>

53 EGAP. (n.d.). Hromadskyi biudjet [Community budget]. Retrieved from: <https://budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/>

54 SocialBoost. (n.d.). Hromadskyi proekt [Community project]. Retrieved from: <https://pb.org.ua/en>

55 Among other PB practitioners in Ukraine there are higher estimations of the number of such communities. Perhaps, other communities that have introduced this participation instrument but have not announced this online. Or, perhaps, this information was difficult to find using online search engines. Thereby, this research considers only those PB cases in Ukraine that were identified online by the end of May 2019.

56 Zelenodolsk City. (n.d.). Biudzhet uchasti [Participatory budgeting]. Retrieved from: <https://zelenodolsk.pb.org.ua/about>

57 According to the law “On Access to Public Information,” an information controller is obliged to provide an answer to an information request within 5 business days since the receipt of a request. Only if a request relates to a massive amount of information or requires a search among a large amount of data, an answer should be provided within 20 business days.

tained information on all or almost all questions of the statistical information request, while 11 answers (7.9%) were severely incomplete, and frequently simply referred to legal acts. Thereby, in this research, the actual sample of communities that have introduced PB is comprised of 141 communities that are subject to the analysis.

Such a sample ensures **high accuracy of the obtained data**. Provided that communities that have not answered requests are distributed randomly, the actual sample of communities is a simple random sample. Respectively, for a variable with data for all 141 communities of the total 154, the sampling error for qualitative variables does not exceed 2.4%, and for quantitative—1%. This means that statistics with respective sample errors calculated for this sample of 141 communities will be also observed in the population of 154 identified communities with a 95% probability. When some variables possess data of a smaller number of communities, sampling error is higher.

To **clarify and complement** the statistical data obtained from LSGs, a **legal analysis** of legal acts and the **collection of statistical data from open sources** were conducted. PB regulations were used to complement and clarify the data on PB cycles and project voting formats. Similarly, the decrees of local councils were used to clarify data on local budgets. Data on the gender distribution of project authors, the number of those who voted for projects, and the number of completed projects was supplemented by the online platform “Community project.”<sup>58</sup> Besides, data on the population of communities was supplemented by the report of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (further—SSSU)<sup>59</sup> and the government website “Decentralization” (further—Decentralization).<sup>60</sup>

The obtained data on PB in 141 communities was processed by **statistical analysis**: the analysis of the measures of variation (minimum, maximum, variation range, and standard deviation) and the measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode), dispersion analysis, parametric and non-parametric correlation analysis, and a linear regression analysis.

After this, 9 communities were selected for more detailed **case studies**. The primary selection criterion was the percentage of the total community population who have voted for PB projects, realized in 2018 (the most recent year when PB cycles finished, and supposedly with the richest data). Such data was available for 74 communities (for more detailed information see Appendix 4). To compare commensurate cases such list was divided into 3 clusters by population size: million-person communities (over 1,000,000 residents), one-hundred-person communities (less than 1,000,000, but over 100,000 residents), and thousand-person communities (less than 100,000, but over 1,000 residents). Within each cluster, communities were selected with the criterion of the percentage of those who voted for PB projects of the total community population<sup>61</sup>: with the highest percentage, with the lowest percentage, and with the median percentage (the one located in the middle of the list ranked by percentage number)—thereby a contrast sample was applied. Aiming to analyze the experience of PB introduction in these communities, beyond SSSU and Decentralization data, and municipal development strategies, sociological survey data was employed. These surveys, representative for local residents aged 18 and older with the sampling error of 3.5%, were conducted in January-February 2016, 2017, and 2018 by

58 SocialBoost. (n.d.). Hromadskiyi proekt [Community project]. Retrieved from: <https://pb.org.ua/en>

59 State Statistics Service of Ukraine. (2019). Chyselnist' nayavnoho naseleння Ukrainy na 1 sichnia 2019 roku [Ukrainian population as of 1 January 2019]. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: [http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ\\_new1/2019/zb\\_chnn2019.pdf](http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2019/zb_chnn2019.pdf)

60 State Websites of Ukraine. (n.d.). Decentralization. Retrieved from: <https://decentralization.gov.ua/en/>

61 In its response to the information request, the Odesa city council has not provided data about the number of those who voted for PB projects, thus, this number was estimated. The total number of votes was divided by 5—the maximum number of votes that could have been cast by an individual voter. Thus, this is the minimum possible number of people who voted. The actual number of voters might differ but such calculation at least provides an approximate minimal assessment useful for further analysis.

Rating Group Ukraine on the behalf of International Republican Institute.<sup>62</sup> Also, expert interviews were conducted.

The **expert interviews** were conducted by the research author with the representatives of each community selected as a case. In each community, the selection criterion was the competency level about the introduction, the implementation, and the impact of PB in a community. To comprehend the Kyiv city case, the key experts were selected, whose participation in the development and the perfection of PB design the researcher witnessed himself. Several practitioners in thousand-person communities and in the Kramatorsk city were recommended by the professionals of the online platforms where locals vote for PB projects. Respondents of other cities were recommended by the professionals of the participatory community of Ukraine. Some respondents advised further respondents (the “snowball” sampling technique). In some cases, more than two informants agreed to narrate about PB. Therefore, the actual sample is comprised of 2 or 3 interviews per community. In total, in 9 communities, 23 semi-structured expert interviews about PB were conducted (2 offline and 21 online); sometimes, clarifying questions were asked online (the list of interviewed experts is presented in Appendix 5). The core of an interview was comprised of 14 questions (see Appendix 2), yet, in the course of interviews other clarifying questions were asked, therefore, the interviews were semi-structured. On average, an interview lasted for 37 minutes. The interviews were conducted from 12 August till 10 September 2019. Every interview was transcribed into a text. The experts were informed about the research aim and agreed to be cited by names. The interview data was processed by a content analysis by identifying unique phenomena and typical patterns.

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62 IRI. (2018). Fourth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: [https://www.iri.org.ua/sites/default/files/editor-files/municipal\\_poll\\_2018\\_ua.pdf](https://www.iri.org.ua/sites/default/files/editor-files/municipal_poll_2018_ua.pdf)


## 2. The overall impact of participatory budgeting in Ukraine

This section presents the findings of the statistical analysis of PB data provided by LSGs and collected on online platforms. This section focuses on the tendencies of development and PB impact in the country in general rather than in individual communities. Also, hypotheses about possible factors strengthening PB impact were tested.

### 2.1 Participatory budgeting trends

In Ukraine, communities started to introduce PB in 2015. As mentioned above, according to our data, the first cities to introduce PB were Chernihiv and Cherkasy whose municipalities have adopted PB regulations in August 2015. The highest number of new communities have introduced PB in 2017—at least 58. In the next years, the number of new LSGs which adopted PB regulations started to decline (see Graph 2.1.1). Probably, this is taking place because the majority of communities that aimed to introduce PB did this in previous years. Or, new communities introducing PB are predominantly small communities, for instance, amalgamated hromadas (further—AH), and do not report PB introduction on the internet, so are difficult to detect.

**Graph 2.1.1 The year of PB introduction in Ukraine’s communities**



As of 19 July 2019, half of 141 analyzed communities have implemented at least 1 full cycle—from the announcement of the cycle start to the completion of projects. Some communities, such as Vinnytsia, Zhovkva, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kaniv, Kremenchuk, Kryvyi Rih, Pyriatyn AH, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv have implemented 3 full cycles.

In some communities, the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle is shorter than the 1<sup>st</sup> one, while in others the former is longer. Nevertheless, starting from the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle, the PB cycle increases: on average, the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle is longer than the 1<sup>st</sup> by 3 months. Probably, the experience of introduction motivates to reserve more time for the preparation and the implementation of PB. Moreover, if the necessity of cycle prolonging is recognized after the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, when the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle has begun, it is logical that the relevant changes to PB regulation will



be introduced from the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle.

On average, in 2015-2018, communities allocated 0.4-0.5% of the total community expenditures for PB.<sup>63</sup> Only 12 communities demonstrate the practice of project co-funding. It is noteworthy that on average each year communities planned to allocate for PB by 52.8% more than in the previous year. On average, the actual expenditures for PB grew by 50.1% annually.<sup>64</sup> Thereby, although the plan somehow exceeded practice, PB expenditures were growing fast. One might assume that local authorities allocated more financial resources for PB because it was acknowledged to be a successful instrument for community development.

Mainly, communities do not allocate special employees to work exclusively with PB. Usually, employees handle PB together with other duties. The number of employees who implement PB varies from 1 to 25. Only 11 LSGs (13.9% of the total number of LSGs that have provided relevant data) state that they have employees whose duties are exclusively PB (4 communities have 1 employee and 7 communities have 2 employees).

To inform about PB, LSGs employ from 2 to 6 types of communication channels, 4 on average (for example, newspapers, television, websites, and social media). Moreover, among 123 LSGs that have reported about the number of communication channels, only 45 (about 1/3) were able to estimate the audience covered by information materials on PB. This is surprising because if this standard public relations indicator is lacking, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of an information campaign. Also, only 13 LSGs (9.2% of the total number of communities that have provided answers to information requests) informed that they fund communication campaigns about PB. The median audience coverage comprises around 1/4 of the total community population.<sup>65</sup> This data indicates that communication activities are insufficient in the majority of communities implementing PB.

Regarding the profiles of PB authors, in all cycles, female authors prevailed. In the first two cycles, the median share of female authors comprised 63% of all authors, in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and in the 4<sup>th</sup> cycles—58% and 59.5% respectively.<sup>66</sup> This is a positive outcome, although it goes in line with the regularity of female representation in Ukraine's elected authorities: the lower is the level of authority, the more it is accessible for women. To compare, according to the data of the Institute for Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the share of female representatives among village councils was 51%, town councils—43%, rayon councils—23%, city and oblast councils—14% and 10% respectively.<sup>67</sup> Although usually, persons aged 18 years and older can submit PB projects, some communities allow this from 16 or even 14.

From the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle to the next ones the dynamics of submitted projects, the shares of projects put for voting, the shares of winning projects and completed projects vary across communities: they decrease, increase, or remain relatively stable. At the same time, taking into account sampling errors, median and average values remain relatively unchanged. The median share of put for voting projects is 84.2% of the total submitted projects in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, 86.2% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, and 77.8% in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle.<sup>68</sup> The average share of winning projects counted of the total number of projects put for voting is 38.7% in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle,

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63 It is worth considering that here the share of PB was calculated to the total community budget. If one calculates the amount of PB funding as a share of only capital funds, such share of PB will be bigger.

64 The data is available for 33 communities.

65 Such data is available for 36 communities.


66 The amount of data for the 1st cycle is 44 cases, 34 cases—for the 2nd, and it is quite limited for the 3rd and the 4th cycles—18 and 8 cases respectively.

67 Herasymenko, H. (2015). Tsili Rozvytku Tysyacholittia v Ukrayini: gendernyi vymir [Millennium Development Goals in Ukraine: The gender dimension]. Retrieved from: <https://idss.org.ua/arhiv>

68 For the 1st cycle there is data for 129 communities, for the 2nd cycle—for 87 communities, and for the 3rd cycle—for 45 communities.

33.5% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, and 31.6% in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle; however, the median shares of winning projects are lower—27.6% in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, 26.3% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, and 25.4% in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle.<sup>69</sup> Yet, the majority of communities successfully realize PB projects. In the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, over 50% of communities realized all winning projects. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, the median share of completed projects reached 94%. The average value of the share of completed projects was 89.5% in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle and 88.2% in the 2<sup>nd</sup>, while the standard deviation<sup>70</sup> for both cycles was around 19%.

**Graph 2.1.2 The share of completed PB projects in the 1<sup>st</sup> and in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycles**



Apparently, the most distinctive PB stage is voting for projects. According to LSG’s data, in 2 communities (Hlobyn rayon and Zhydachiv city), PB projects are selected according to voting by a commission. Strictly speaking, this does not comply with the PB model as direct democracy. Nevertheless, in 134 communities (98.5% of the total number of communities with relevant data) PB projects are defined by a binding popular vote—the method of direct democracy. Also, according to the PAUCI data, at least in two communities in the East of Ukraine, assemblies were gathered to deliberate and define priority projects.<sup>71</sup>

The voting format varies substantially. In the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, among 135 communities with available data, an exclusively paper voting was applied in 12 communities (8.9%), mixed paper-electronic voting—in 90 communities (66.7%), and exclusively electronic voting—in 33 communities (24.4%). In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, among 96 communities with available data, exclusively paper voting was applied in 6 communities (6.2%), mixed paper-electronic voting—in 67 communities (69.8%), and exclusively electronic voting—in 23 communities (24%). In the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle, among communities with relevant data, exclusively paper voting was present in 3 communities (5.3%), mixed paper-electronic—in 37 communities (64.9%), exclusively electronic voting—in 17 communities (29.8%).

During the whole time of PB in Ukraine, at least 17 communities (12.6% of those with available data) performed typical shifts in the voting format. They were 5 typical shifts: from an electronic to a mixed voting—1 community, from a mixed to a paper voting—1 community, from a paper to a mixed voting—5 communities, from a paper through a mixed to an electronic voting—2 communities, from a mixed to an electronic voting—8 communities. Among communities, which have changed the voting format, 15 communities (88.2%) were moving towards a more digital one. Thus, the uppermost trend is the digitalization of voting for PB projects.

69 For the 1st cycle there is data for 128 communities, for the 2nd cycle—for 85 communities, and for the 3rd cycle—for 38 communities.

70 In statistics a standard deviation demonstrates how much on average individual values of a variable deviate from its average value.

71 PAUCI. (2019). Hromadskyi biudzheth na Shodi Ukrainy—intehratsiya zarady rozvytku [Participatory budgeting in the East of Ukraine—integration for development]. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: [https://pauci.org/upload/files/integration\\_for\\_development.pdf](https://pauci.org/upload/files/integration_for_development.pdf)

This research devotes considerable attention to the share of the total population engaged in voting for PB projects. It is reasonable to assume that this indicator denotes the efficiency of PB as an instrument of local democracy development and community mobilization. This variable is rather volatile– its values vary from 0.2% (in Chortkiv in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle) to 43.9% (in Bashtanka in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle). The median of voting participation equals 3.7%, 4.1%, and 5.3% in the 1<sup>st</sup>, the 2<sup>nd</sup>, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycles respectively. This indicator is applied to the selection of PB case studies, and communities are aggregated in 3 clusters by population size. In communities with small population size, citizens can be easier engaged in voting for PB projects than in big communities. The highest engagement rates detected in less populous communities prove this assumption. In the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, these are Muzykivka AH–26.2%, Bashtanka–24.4%, and Tsarychanka–23%. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, these are Yavoriv–26.9%, Bashtanka–21.6%, and Shumsk AH–17.1%. In the third cycle, these are Bashtanka–43.9%, Pyriatyn AH–18.3%, and Zhovkva–16.3%. The population of all of these communities is less than 100,000 residents. Besides, although usually the right to vote for PB projects is for persons aged 18 years and older, some communities grant this right to youth from 16 or even 14.

## 2.2 The factors of participatory budgeting impact

The primary aim of this subsection is to detect factors of PB impact at the local level. For this aim, 73 communities with sufficient data were selected. The list of these communities is provided in Appendix 4.

PB impact is measured by the “vote” variable, which denotes the share of the population in a certain community, which has voted for PB projects, realized by the end of 2018. It is assumed that the more people were engaged in voting, the bigger was the PB impact on the development of democratic participation in a respective community.

The independent variables are: “exp”–the share of funding PB projects of the total community expenditures budget<sup>72</sup> in 2018 (in percentages); “dur”–the number of full PB cycles by 2018 (in units);

“impl1”–the share of completed projects of the total number of winning projects in the cycle preceding 2018 (in percentages).

Hypothetically, the bigger funding allocated for PB projects and the bigger PB experience community have, and the more projects have been completed in the past, the more population will be involved in PB voting.

**Table 2.2.1 Descriptive statistics**


stats	vote	exp	dur	impl1
N	73	66	73	68
mean	5.351684	.3652489	1.616438	.9044528
sd	4.998813	.4343747	.6589161	.1365182
p50	3.450113	.206607	2	1
min	.2056978	.0117309	1	.4117647
max	26.21053	1.881133	3	1

<sup>72</sup> An alternative technique is also possible. It would consider the share of funds allocated for PB as a part of the available community capital funds. It allows to clearly descry the share of PB funds of the currently available funds. Instead, the share of PB funding as a part of the total community budget denotes the maximum possible budget share, which potentially can be approved by citizen engagement. Such involvement can rely on PB or on consultations about budget regulation. For this aim, the share of PB of the total budget is preferable for comparison.

The presented table demonstrates that the most volatile indicator is “vote,” for its minimum value equals 0.2% (the percentage of people who voted for PB projects of the total community population), and its maximum value is 26.2%.

Whereas the “vote” indicator is very volatile, it is reasonable to review the control chart of this variable.

**Graph 2.2.1** The control map of the “vote” and “exp” variables



The Graph 2.2.1 shows that 4 communities have a considerably higher share of the population that has voted for PB projects, compared to other communities. Thus, it is reasonable to review these cases and examine the causes of such stellar results. The third section will uncover the case of Muzykivka AH with the highest “vote” value of 26.2%.

The other variables are not that volatile and do not contain outlier cases. A median PB community in Ukraine involves 3.5% of its population into voting, spends 0.2% of its budgets for PB projects, has implemented 2 full cycles, and realized all projects in the previous cycle. **PB is a relatively new phenomenon in Ukraine, and therefore, communities are cautious in funding it. Yet, project realization is rather successful.**

**Table 2.2.2** Correlation matrix

	vote	exp	dur	impl1
vote	1.0000			
exp	0.0875	1.0000		
dur	-0.0021	0.0538	1.0000	
impl1	0.2157	0.1860	0.0701	1.0000

Table 2.2.2 shows that relationships among the selected variables are rather minor. The highest correlation is between the share of voters and the share of projects completed in the previous cycle. Also, it is remarkable that the relationship between the “vote” and the “exp” variables is positive as was expected. In other words, the more resources are allocated for realizing PB projects, and the more projects have been completed in the previous cycle, the more people have been engaged in voting. However, it is unexpected that the relationship between the “vote” and the “dur” variables is negative. This means that the more experience in implementing PB a community has, the less population is engaged in voting. Yet,

it should be noted that this regularity is observed frequently, but not always. Conversely, in some communities the share of voters increases with subsequent cycles, while in others it oscillates across years.

The correlation matrix in a graph mode does not demonstrate evidence of linear links among selected variables.

**Table 2.2.3 Regression analysis**

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	79.4316872	3	26.4772291	Number of obs =	62	
Residual	1533.78506	58	26.4445701	F( 3, 58) =	1.00	
				Prob > F =	0.3989	
				R-squared =	0.0492	
				Adj R-squared =	0.0001	
Total	1613.21675	61	26.4461763	Root MSE =	5.1424	

vote	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
exp	.6333599	1.654115	0.38	0.703	-2.677712	3.944432
dur	-.1490617	.9897168	-0.15	0.881	-2.130195	1.832072
impl1	7.730517	4.856976	1.59	0.117	-1.991778	17.45281
_cons	-1.370059	4.556943	-0.30	0.765	-10.49177	7.751654

The absence of significant linear relationships among the considered variables is confirmed by regression analysis. No coefficient has a p-value close to 0.05. Thereby, a statistically significant linear relationship among these variables has not been detected. The coefficients of “exp” and “impl1” are positive, while the coefficient of “dur” is negative.

**There are grounds to conclude that the hypothesis about the influence on the number of voters by indicators such as the share of PB projects funding of the total community budget, the number of full cycles of PB implementation, and the share of projects completed in the previous cycle has not been confirmed by regression analysis. It is reasonable to seek other indicators that might significantly influence citizen engagement into PB process.**

With the aim of finding such parameters, the case study methodology is applied further.

## 3. The case studies of participatory budgeting in Ukraine

For a detailed examination of PB impact on communities and its causes, 9 communities were selected.<sup>73</sup>

At first, all communities were grouped in 3 clusters by population size: over 1,000,000 (million-person communities), under 1,000,000, but over 100,000 (one-hundred-thousand-person communities), and under 100,000, but over 1,000 (thousand-person communities). It is important to take into account community scale since it is not equally easy to engage a quarter of all community in a million-person city or in a small community with only several thousand residents.

Then, in each cluster, 3 communities were selected—with the highest, the lowest, and the median<sup>74</sup> percentage of the population that has voted for PB projects for realization in 2018. This indicator is most relevant for measuring PB impact, whereas it denotes citizen involvement in decision making at the local level.

Using these criteria, the following communities represent the cases of PB impact:

- Million-person communities: Kyiv (4.5% voters), Dnipro (3.2%), and Odesa (2.8%);
- One-hundred-thousand-person communities: Lviv (9.9% voters), Zaporizhzhia (3.5%), and Kramatorsk (0.6%);
- Thousand-person communities: Muzykivka AH (26.2% voters), Khmilnyk (4.4%), and Chortkiv (0.2%).

### 3.1 Million-person communities

#### Kyiv

Kyiv city (the capital) is the biggest city in Ukraine by population size: according to SSSU data, as of January 2019, its population exceeded 2.9 mln residents. PB in Kyiv was introduced in September 2016. Since then, as of July 2019, 2 full cycles have been implemented. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, as many as 4.5% of the city population voted for PB projects.

The number of PB winning projects in Kyiv increases annually, as well as the amount of funds allocated for their realization (see Table 3.1.1). Education is predominating among all project categories. Although in 2017 and in 2019 education was the 2<sup>nd</sup> among submitted projects, it gained the leading position after popular vote. This indicates the importance of this theme for the residents. Sports was also ranked in top-3 categories among winning projects in all PB cycles. The comparison PB winning project sectors with the priorities outlined in the Kyiv city development strategy by 2025<sup>75</sup> illuminates that PB projects conform with all strategic goals, namely:

1. To increase the Kyiv economy competitiveness, tourism in particular.
2. To increase the Kyiv residents' life comfort, in particular, education and the environment.
3. To preserve the historical uniqueness and the development of culture in Kyiv, evidently, culture.

<sup>73</sup> See appendix 4 for the complete list of the 74 communities with the available data on the share of voters for PB projects implemented in 2018.

<sup>74</sup> The median percentage is located in the middle of the list, sorted by the number of percentages.

<sup>75</sup> KCSA. (2017). Stratehiya rozvytku mista Kyieva do 2015 roku [Kyiv city development strategy by 2025]. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: <https://dei.kyivcity.gov.ua/files/2017/7/28/Strategy2025new.pdf>

The majority of projects are focused on the 2<sup>nd</sup> strategic goal—“to increase the Kyiv residents’ life comfort.”

**Table 3.1.1 The winning projects in the Kyiv city**

	2017	2018	2019
The number of winning projects	62	141	341
The amount of funds for the realization of projects (UAH)	49,996,027	149,171,200	149,824,056
The top-3 categories of winning projects	Education, sports, environment	Education, sports, culture and tourism	Education, civil society, sports

Source: The “Community budget” platform

Overall, the winning projects of PB in Kyiv accord with the strategic vision of city development.

According to the ex-member of the Kyiv Community Budget Commission (further—CBC),<sup>76</sup> due to the PB introduction the institutional capacity of the whole civil society has increased, projects of individual residents have won as well as new project teams have emerged, and socially responsible business has joined PB. He also told that the PB process acts as a citizenship school, projects become more innovative, the high-tech community and the creative class evolved from distrust to trust to PB, CBC functions as an appeal jury trial institution with the authority to judge. Indeed, the scale of civic activism is corroborated by the annual increase of submitted projects and the number of voters (almost 4-fold from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 4<sup>th</sup> cycle). Civic education is proven by the activities of the Kyiv Participatory Budgeting School.<sup>77</sup> In fact, due to the e-elections of delegates from the public to CBC Kyiv residents have been empowered.<sup>78</sup> Though, the 2<sup>nd</sup> selection round when CBC members are elected by the candidates who have won in the 1<sup>st</sup> round has in practice introduced an expertocracy. These observations are supported and complemented by the contemplations of the member of the PB working group of the Kyiv City Council (further—KCC).<sup>79</sup> He explained that while KCC got the final say during the development of PB regulation, the influence of the civil society was bigger than of the authorities, the discussants always found a consensus, the PB jury trial heeded parties’ arguments and its decisions are binding for the authorities to enact, yet the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of voting for CBC members turns into deals among groups of organizations. Besides, he noted that PB has become a social lift, since about 20 PB authors became public officials of the local self-government and executive authorities of the Kyiv city.

Regarding the impact of PB on local self-governance, the KCC official<sup>80</sup> indicated that active Kyiv residents express their views in a more productive and less costly for authorities way and seek compromise; the number of pickets at KCC building has reduced; the budget process has become more transparent, and municipal agencies solve regular challenges much easier. Moreover, according to the civil society representative,<sup>81</sup> while some KCC delegates act in schools, the number of delegate-led projects has decreased considerably, municipal departments have changed their attitude towards PB from critical to positive, and became more open. He also indicated that the municipal financial department was impressed by PB and developed the budget regulation with public consultations about the whole municipal budget. The official KCC website proves the adoption of the Budget Regulation of the capital city involv-

76 Serhiy Loboyko (Center for Innovations Development), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, Kyiv, 12 August 2019.

77 Facebook. (n.d.). Shkola Hromadskoho Biudzhetu Kyieva [Kyiv Participatory Budgeting School]. Retrieved from: <https://www.facebook.com/gbschoolkyiv/>

78 Kyiv City. (n.d.). Konkurs Hromadskoyi Buidzhetnoyi Komisiyi tvoho mista [The contest for the Participatory Budgeting Commission of your city]. Retrieved from: <https://gb.kyivcity.gov.ua/gbk>

79 Ihor Khatsevych (Kyiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, Kyiv, 12 August 2019.

80 Ihor Khatsevych (Kyiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, Kyiv, 12 August 2019.

81 Serhiy Loboyko (Center for Innovations Development), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, Kyiv, 12 August 2019.

ing the local community.<sup>82</sup> Besides, the PB efficiency is proved by the high realization rate of PB projects (over 80%).

The co-author of the Kyiv PB regulation of the civil society<sup>83</sup> is convinced that the success of PB in the capital city is due to a set of causes: the public seized the initiative of developing PB, started public discussions of PB regulation, moderated the working group within the municipality, found agents of change within the municipality—during the work on e-petitions and due to the reload of PB regulation—so the stakeholders reached a publicly announced consensus. He explained that the KCC, which sought to legitimize PB, took on the public commitment to make PB public-driven; the KCC delegates were obliged to announce their participation in PB in public; the project ranking takes into account the ratio of votes to a project budget; project authors have an official right to sign or stop project realization; the whole process of realizing projects is open and accountable to the executives and the public. The co-author of the Kyiv PB regulation of the municipality<sup>84</sup> stated that PB became successful because during the work on e-petitions the public and the authorities learned to interact, hear each other, and seek for the most efficient mechanism. As an example of such a design he recalled e-voting: although initially there were some problems with the voting with a Kyivite Card, overall e-voting shielded against third-party manipulation and miscount. In his view, from the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, people began to trust PB.

## Dnipro

Dnipro city (an oblast center) has around 1 mln population—according to SSSU data of January 2019. PB in Dnipro was introduced in August 2016. Since then, as of July 2019, 2 full cycles have been implemented. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, 3.2% of the total city population voted for PB projects.

The number of winning projects and PB funding greatly increased in the 3<sup>rd</sup> PB cycle. Among the top-3 categories of winning projects the 2<sup>nd</sup> position is held by the city development and infrastructure, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> position—by sports. Public utilities were leading in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, while education—in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> ones (see Table 3.1.2).

**Table 3.1.2 The winning projects in Dnipro city**

	2017-2018 (cycle 1)	2017-2018 (cycle 2)	2018-2019 (cycle 3)
The number of winning projects	64	52	111
The amount of funds for the realization of projects (UAH)	15,458,584	15,247,556	30,855,514
The top-3 categories of winning projects	Utilities, city development and infrastructure, sports	Education, city development and infrastructure, sports	Education, city development and infrastructure, sports

The city development strategy by 2020<sup>85</sup> outlines 3 strategic strands:

82 Kyiv Official Portal. (2019, May 16). Kyivrada zatverdyla Biudzhetni rehlyment [Kyiv City Council has adopted the Budget Regulation]. Retrieved from: [https://kyivcity.gov.ua/news/kivrada\\_zatverdila\\_byudzhetniy\\_rehlyment/](https://kyivcity.gov.ua/news/kivrada_zatverdila_byudzhetniy_rehlyment/)

83 Serhiy Loboyko (Center for Innovations Development), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, Kyiv, 12 August 2019.

84 Ihor Khatsevych (Kyiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, Kyiv, 12 August 2019.

85 Dnipro City Council. (n.d.). Stratehichniy plan rozvytku mista Dnipropetrovska by 2020 [The Strategic Plan for the Development of Dnipropetrovsk City by 2020]. Retrieved from: <http://old.dniprorada.gov.ua/images/stories/1.pdf>



1. The space of free entrepreneurship.
2. The space of healthy environment.
3. The space of high-quality urban infrastructure.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> strategic strand is reflected in the PB winning projects.

The representative of Dnipro local authorities<sup>86</sup> told that the public had a direct influence on the review of projects and complaints because it was in the PB commission—from 2019 the public comprises half of the commission formed by the municipality. She indicated that usually active citizens become project authors and those who submit projects for the fourth time, become professionals whose projects are indeed perfect. She told that one project author became a member of PB commission, and two others became municipal employees. These conclusions are partly confirmed by statistics, which provides evidence that the number of submitted projects in Dnipro slightly decreases annually, yet the share of completed projects increases (up to 75% in the 3-rd cycle). Herewith, according to the observations of the Dnipro PB process facilitator,<sup>87</sup> project authors wrote official requests and inquired the council delegates about project realization, yet later the authors switched from PB to other initiatives and became active in the civil society. The fact that authors have to demand reports on the realization of their projects indicates a high level of civic activism but also a low level of public accountability.

Regarding the impact of PB on local self-governance, the municipality representative<sup>88</sup> admitted that public officials do change—they recognize the city needs PB that is a good mechanism of interaction between the population and the municipality; they review projects more proficient and participate in PB regulation amendments more actively. From another perspective,<sup>89</sup> online reporting by authorities about the realization of many projects is insufficient, besides, some officials were disappointed by PB implementation, and left the authorities for the civil society.

The ambiguous situation with Dnipro PB might be related to the multiple changes of responsible officials and PB format. From the viewpoint of the trainer for the development and introduction of PB in Dnipro,<sup>90</sup> political situation has caused internal conflict among municipal agencies, and the new agency received the PB duties in the middle of voting, which caused tremendous problems and disappointed authors. She added that there was a conflict of interest—the platform administrator was the author of the winning project. She further explained that in the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, condominium associations could submit projects as legal entities, although the city had another supporting program, which was politically motivated. According to her, the change of PB rules led to distrust, in contrast, when officials sincerely crave change, people trust them and PB works. Both authorities and authors are on track to build business-processes. The municipality representative indicated<sup>91</sup> that the 2016 PB program did not function, for persons who developed it were not skilled in the budget process and that the implementing agency changed. She also told that despite terms of reference (further—ToR) were agreed with project authors, 1/5 of authors have not provided it on time, so the auction was announced by municipal agencies without an agreed ToR and failed. Yet, she said that authors participating in several cycles learn the law, the authorities learn to cooperate with the public, and when comfortable relationships between the authorities and the authors are built, projects are realized quickly and smoothly.

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86 Yuliia Pavliuk (Dnipro City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

87 Iryna Stasiuk (Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

88 Yuliia Pavliuk (Dnipro City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

89 Iryna Stasiuk (Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

90 Iryna Stasiuk (Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

91 Yuliia Pavliuk (Dnipro City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

## Odesa

Odesa city (an oblast center) has around 1 mln population—according to SSSU data of January 2019. PB was introduced in Odesa in February 2017. 2 full cycles have been implemented as of July 2019. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, 2.8% of the city population voted for PB projects.

Compared to 2017, in 2018 the number of winning projects in Odesa has almost halved (see Table 3.1.3). Still, the funding for their realization has remained the same. This indicates an increase of expenses per project. Since the distribution of winning projects by categories has been found neither in open sources nor in responses to information requests, it is difficult to identify top-3 categories. Yet, it is apparent that the majority of PB projects in 2017 and 2018 referred to city development and infrastructure.

**Table 3.1.3 The winning projects in the Odesa city**

	2017	2018
The number of winning projects	40	22
The amount of funds for the realization of projects (UAH)	99,518,891	99,884,688

The strategy of economic and social development of Odesa city by 2022<sup>92</sup> specifies a set of strategic goals, which are attained also by realizing the PB winning projects.

Opinions about PB impact on the Odesa city community are ambiguous. Thus, a civic activist<sup>93</sup> noticed that each year the interest towards PB declines because a small share of projects is realized. This is corroborated by statistical data, which provides evidence that in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, the share of realized projects was around 55%, while the number of submitted projects has declined by 2.4 times from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle. Still, there is an alternative perspective. One of the project authors<sup>94</sup> during the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle suspected PB to be a typical money laundering, but later saw several winning and funded projects, therefore, he submitted one, won, and completed his project in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle. Yet, he admitted that he communicated with some commission members individually and pitched his project. In his opinion, authors have been organizing activities in the city before PB, they only became more experienced. According to his experience, a project author does not have any influence over project realization—a maximum input would be to compose ToR and insist on re-announcing a tender. He observed that some PB commission members were public figures and businessmen unrelated to authorities, some are even in opposition to the power, and have a formidable influence in the commission due to critical questions and useful evaluation. From the standpoint of the municipal agency, managing PB,<sup>95</sup> municipal agencies with active council delegates developed PB regulation and introduced a separate online platform, they did not cooperate with the public actively because they were preparing their own draft. Besides, she noted that 5 of the 15 PB commission members represent the public, and other citizens can be present at a commission meeting or can watch a meeting streaming or recording. She added that the public can offer inputs to the regulation, but not everything is taken into account.

Concerning the PB impact on local self-governance, the municipality representative<sup>96</sup> recognized that some projects were realized smoothly, while others were either difficult to be realized or were not realized

92 Odesa City Council. (2013). Stratehiya ekonomichnoho i sotsialnoho rozvytku mista Odesy do 2022 roku [The strategy of economic and social development of Odesa city by 2022]. Retrieved from: [https://omr.gov.ua/images/File/DODATKI2013/Strategiya\\_Odessa\\_Ukr.pdf](https://omr.gov.ua/images/File/DODATKI2013/Strategiya_Odessa_Ukr.pdf)

93 Yurii Diachenko (Democratic Alliance-Odesa), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 10 September 2019.

94 Victor Yehorov (Odesa National Academy of Food Technologies), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

95 Oksana Tachkovska (Odesa City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 28 August 2019.

96 Oksana Tachkovska (Odesa City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 28 August 2019.

at all, because of some shortcomings, in particular, there are difficulties with projects review due to the lack of time and human resources. A civic activist<sup>97</sup> voiced a more critical viewpoint that PB started not very transparently because the voting platform presentation was obscured and attended by loyal persons, some people were not allowed to attend the presentation, many activities were behind closed doors, and PB amendments were introduced in maximum secrecy. He further explained that the PB commission has a minority of civil society and a majority of council deputies and public officials. He pointed out that municipal agencies can submit projects, registration and voting are possible with a passport scan, so there are many fake votes as officials allegedly misuse passport data for voting for other projects. This is why one can see a total number of votes, but not the voters themselves. He indicates that assistants of council deputies offered him to “generate votes.” Moreover, he noted that part of funding for small projects was transferred to the funding for several big projects, while the funding for failed small projects is not redirected to other projects, but is lost for such allocation; even after a project has passed all stages and should be realized, a budget commission can refuse to fund it. Also, he criticized that often authorities realized projects which were non-approved, or not in the foreseen sites, or have not realized them at all, or overstated funding; authorities split procurements and conducted under-threshold procurements for the “preferred” contractors; the detailed reports necessary for checking the efficiency of project realization and the use of public funds were missing. At least this explains that Odesa PB platform<sup>98</sup> displays only the overall number of votes, not the number of voters.

There are diverse opinions about the causes of such an ambiguous situation with Odesa PB. The municipality representative<sup>99</sup> assumes that the PB regulation has not envisaged everything. Instead, the civic activist<sup>100</sup> believes that some council delegates are interested in PB to push their own projects via third parties; there are privileged NGOs’ winning projects; one project author is a member of the PB commission with a clear conflict of interests; public officials lack motivation; sometimes project expertise is carried over by one municipal agency, while these projects are realized by other entities; other officials perform their project expertise duties poorly; the expertise period is too short; mass media cover the most scandalous news and circulate negative views. Yet, from the perspective of another project author,<sup>101</sup> when people are active and interested in project realization, and invest efforts in it, projects they support are completed despite the inactivity of municipal agencies. He assumed that many people are afraid of giving away their passport data to the internet, so only active and digitally savvy locals vote online.

## 3.2 One-hundred-thousand-person communities

### Lviv

According to SSSU data, since January 2019 Lviv city (oblast center) has over 700,000 inhabitants. PB was introduced in Lviv in June 2016. Since then and up to July 2019 as many as 2 full cycles were implemented. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, 9.9% of the city population voted for PB projects.

In Lviv, the funding of PB winning projects increases annually. The number of winning projects was the highest in 2016 (see Table 3.2.1). The “Community project” platform distinguishes only educational and medical projects among all winning projects. Probably, this is because of quotas these project types have in Lviv.

97 Yurii Diachenko (Democratic Alliance-Odesa), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 10 September 2019.

98 Odesa City Council. (n.d.). Hromadskyi biudjet [Community budget]. Retrieved from: <https://citizen.odessa.ua/projects/>

99 Oksana Tachkovska (Odesa City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 28 August 2019.

100 Yurii Diachenko (Democratic Alliance-Odesa), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 10 September 2019.

101 Victor Yehorov (Odesa National Academy of Food Technologies), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

**Table 3.2.1 The winning projects in the Lviv city**

	2016	2017	2018
The number of winning projects	67	38	54
The amount of funds for the realization of projects (UAH)	17,529,965	25,737,173	38,198,578

The strategy for the development of Lviv<sup>102</sup> has 3 priorities. It is notable that PB winning projects focus on city development, education, and sports, which accord with the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> priorities of the city strategy.

The project author and participant of public discussions<sup>103</sup> told that she was involved in the deliberation of PB format update, where the quotas for medical and school projects were agreed. She recalled a case when project authors disputed the supplier, which has won a tender, and authorities took this into account. According to her observations, doctors have believed in PB observing that it is tangible, so the medical community joined PB enthusiastically. Another project author<sup>104</sup> told that she exercised influence at all stages: she is able to informally adjust implementation to conform with the project design, she reaches an agreement without involving municipality leadership and acts as a project manager because the contractor firm doesn't cope with this. Besides, she shared an observation that during the 1<sup>st</sup> PB year, people had not believed in PB funding, they lacked trust and were indifferent to voting, but in the following years, people have developed a better understanding of how municipality functions and the voting increased. This is corroborated by the municipality data: compared to the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, the number of voters in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycles has increased over 3-fold. As a public official recalled,<sup>105</sup> the PB regulation was developed by a working group of council delegates, officials, and activists, and the author approves all public tenders and a realization schedule and oversees project delivery. He added that sometimes locals become projects contractors, working groups of authors and officials are formed upon necessity, in one case, an author's request about a questionable auction caused an official investigation and dismissal of a department head. He admitted that PB authors started to attend public hearings and submit e-petitions, besides, two project authors became MPs.

According to a municipality representative,<sup>106</sup> the municipality collects reports from spending units and reports at official meetings about projects realization monthly, the officials and council delegates learn PB—during the 1<sup>st</sup> year, projects evaluation was postponed, but later the authorities understood PB. In her opinion, the core PB value is its capacity to regain trust between the municipality and the public, and between locals themselves; PB facilitates a productive collaboration between authorities and authors, helps to identify public funds expenses, and favors better exploitation of projects, for they are much better cared about. From a more critical perspective,<sup>107</sup> some school projects were pressured by school managers, some council delegates unduly submitted projects as authors, some university students were mobilized to vote in CASs. According to her, PB regulation is being revised to fix this. A project author<sup>108</sup> shared her impressions that Lviv authorities initiate communication with active people offering to improve city functioning. She recalled a good collaboration with the authorities, which appreciate her advice and aim to help, though partially this is due to knowing her. A high PB efficiency is confirmed by an 80% completion rate.

102 Lviv City Council. (n.d.). *Stratehiya rozvytku Lvova* [The Strategy for the Development of Lviv]. Retrieved from: <https://city-adm.lviv.ua/lmr/strategy-of-lviv>

103 Nataliya Lipska (Charitable Foundation "Wings of Hope"), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 31 August 2019.

104 Ivanna Havrylko (Lviv), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 9 September 2019.

105 Orest Faifurka (Lviv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 27 August 2019.

106 Orest Faifurka (Lviv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 27 August 2019.

107 Nataliya Lipska (Charitable Foundation "Wings of Hope"), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 31 August 2019.

108 Ivanna Havrylko (Lviv), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 9 September 2019.

Regarding causes of PB success in the city, a representative of the public<sup>109</sup> noticed that Lviv has always been active, open, and progressive; PB gained the support of the city leadership; the municipality and the public conduct training for authors. This corresponds with the municipality official's opinion<sup>110</sup> that during PB introduction council delegates, public officials, and civic activists were active, in particular, the working group involved representatives of all council factions. Alternatively, a project author<sup>111</sup> stated that although some municipal agencies are less active and lack synergy with activists, the municipality is very active, especially the partnership department makes a very strong PB promotion and training, and initiates public discussions about PB regulation update.

## Zaporizhzhia

According to SSSU data, since January 2019 Zaporizhzhia city (oblast center) has over 700,000 inhabitants. PB in Zaporizhzhia was introduced in May 2016, and by July 2019 has implemented 2 full cycles. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, 3.5% of the city population voted for PB projects.

In 2016, Zaporizhzhia had 21 winning projects, in 2017–33 winning projects, and in 2018–22 winning projects. According to the Zaporizhzhia PB website,<sup>112</sup> most of the projects were related to city development. This accords with the 3<sup>rd</sup> strand of the Zaporizhzhia development strategy<sup>113</sup>—a more convenient, safe, and creative urban development.

The Head of PB Coordination Council<sup>114</sup> recalled that PB regulation development engaged the public, the public council at the municipality, the council, and the municipality. She explained that of 9 of 15 members of the Coordination Council, that is, the majority, represent the public, yet they are appointed by a mayor without any competition. According to her, a person's charisma helps to influence a Coordination Council's discussion, besides, if an author disagrees with a project's expertise, he or she can appeal; the authorities consult with the authors about the realization of projects, and the authors submitting projects each year comprehend the PB process, circulate the information and share their experience. Yet, she admitted that a part of the population distrustful of the authorities believes that everything is prearranged, and there is no reason to vote, for everything is already decided to grant "privileged" authors. A local official<sup>115</sup> is convinced that the public affects the PB process via the Coordination Council that analyzes projects and counts votes, as well as through voting and projects. From his viewpoint, the community has become more active, enterprising, and aware; people are conscious that they can influence city development and for this aim, they need to invest some effort.

Concerning the democraticness of the PB process and changes in local self-government, a local authorities representative<sup>116</sup> told that the information about the start of PB regulation development was announced in mass media, so everybody could join the process. He also explained that at the stage of discussing PB regulation, council delegates and of community representatives had equal power, whereas nobody had an

109 Ivanna Havrylko (Lviv), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 9 September 2019.

110 Orest Faifurka (Lviv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 27 August 2019.

111 Nataliya Lipska (Charitable Foundation "Wings of Hope"), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 31 August 2019.

112 Zaporizhzhia City Council. (n.d.). Hromadskiy biudzet [Community budget]. Retrieved from: <https://zp.gov.ua/uk/page/gromadskij-byudzhet>

113 Zaporizhzhia City Council. (2017). Stratehiya rozvytku mista Zaporizhzhia do 2028 roku [The strategy of development of Zaporizhzhia city by 2028]. Retrieved from: [https://zp.gov.ua/upload/editor/strategiya\\_izm.pdf](https://zp.gov.ua/upload/editor/strategiya_izm.pdf)

114 Kateryna Akula (Zaporizhzhia Chapter of the Green Party of Ukraine), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

115 Vladyslav Nikolayev (Zaporizhzhia City Council), emailing with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 10 September 2019.

116 Vladyslav Nikolayev (Zaporizhzhia City Council), emailing with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 10 September 2019.

applied experience of introducing PB, yet, in the end, the council had more power, for it adopted the final PB regulation. He also told that many council delegates contact their constituents and involve them into PB, they supervise projects, and at the realization stage, project authors productively collaborate with the authorities, while implementing agencies perform their duties responsibly because they are aware of the civic oversight. The efficiency of PB projects implementation is corroborated by the municipality data, according to which the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle demonstrated a 100% completion rate. The Head of PB Coordination Council<sup>117</sup> assured that the PB process is absolutely transparent, and during the PB regulation development stakeholders reached consensus about the minimum number of votes for project support. Yet, she recognized a collision line between some departments that do not acknowledge PB importance and the majority of agencies that envision PB as an extra opportunity to contribute to city development.

As to the possible causes, which shaped PB in Zaporizhzhia, a local official<sup>118</sup> told that PB was favored by the public's active approach and the aspiration to influence the city and its budget, as well as by the municipality's openness for collaboration with community, its willingness to adopt and enact best European and world practices. Still, a civil society representative<sup>119</sup> assumed that the limits for submitting projects from municipal agencies led to the decrease of submitted projects. Indeed, statistical data showed that from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle the number of submitted projects reduced 3-fold. Moreover, compared to the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, the number of voters decreased too.

## Kramatorsk

According to SSSU data, since January 2019 Kramatorsk city (the host of the Donetsk oblast administration) has over 150,000 inhabitants. PB in Kramatorsk was introduced in November 2016. Since then, as of July 2019, full 2 cycles have been implemented. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, 0.6% of the city population voted for PB projects.

In Kramatorsk, the number of winning projects and the amount of their funding grew annually (Table 3.2.2). Unlike other cities, Kramatorsk has no permanent priority project themes. In 2017, the leading theme was education, in 2018—sport, and in 2019—utilities. They correspond with the operative objectives of the 2<sup>nd</sup> strategic goal of Kramatorsk.<sup>120</sup>

**Table 3.2.2 Winning projects in Kramatorsk city**

	2017	2018	2019
The number of winning projects	5	14	15
The amount of funds for the realization of projects (UAH)	1,542,179	1,919,643	2,455,799

The member of the PB Coordination Council who is delegated from the public<sup>121</sup> explained that the Council, comprised of representatives of the civil society and the municipality, informs city residents about PB, checks and revises submitted projects, monitors voting, and announces voting results. He also mentioned that some former project authors joined the Council. According to the local official,<sup>122</sup> 50%

117 Kateryna Akula (Zaporizhzhia Chapter of the Green Party of Ukraine), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

118 Vladyslav Nikolayev (Zaporizhzhia City Council), emailing with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 10 September 2019.

119 Kateryna Akula (Zaporizhzhia Chapter of the Green Party of Ukraine), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

120 Kramatorsk City Council. (n.d.). Stratehichnyi plan rozvytku mista Kramatorsk [The strategic plan of Kramatorsk city development]. Retrieved from: <http://www.krm.gov.ua/article/view/620>

121 Andrii Romanenko (Act-Kramatorsk), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

122 Yuliia Leonova (Kramatorsk City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

of the Council are NGO members, new Council members are coopted by Council vote, and all Council members have equal power and influence over PB implementation. She observed that initially people were cautious towards PB, but later showed greater curiosity and now they are more aware and willing to solve social problems and interact with local authorities, they generate ideas about city development and eagerly implement them. There is also a critical perspective. Another Council member from the public<sup>123</sup> told that people have become disappointed in PB, and the number of voters decreased after schools were prohibited to submit projects. The actual statistics demonstrate that compared to the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, the number of submitted projects in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycles has somewhat decreased, and the number of voters from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> year has decreased by 4.5 times.

Concerning the impact on local self-governance, the member of the PB Council from the public<sup>124</sup> assessed the first year of PB as a failure because schools massively submitted projects, while managerial pressure was widespread, therefore, the accessibility criterion was introduced later; also, there were attempts to affect voting by managerial pressure, for assistants of a council delegate collected paper voting sheets with marks suggesting what to vote for. Still, he indicated the positive tendency that after widespread paving of lanes and sidewalks the municipality and council delegates at local districts also started to do it on large scale. As for the interaction between the public and the municipality, the Council member from the public<sup>125</sup> told that municipality takes into account suggestions only from the privileged persons, and whereas he is not a local but an internally displaced person, he is not reckoned with. Also, he highlighted the lack of communication between the implementing agencies and the authors, the insufficiently rigorous evaluation of a project's feasibility and budget, the necessity of regular appeals to the Council, a partial or failed project realization, and the deterioration of PB. A local official<sup>126</sup> admitted that there were problems with fake votes on the online platform, which were deleted, but now a voter attaches a passport scan. She voiced an opinion that the authorities understand the city needs better and are more responsible fulfilling those needs. Indeed, the municipality reported an 80% completion rate in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle and a 100% completion rate in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle.

The local official<sup>127</sup> relates the described PB situation in the city to numerous mistakes in PB regulation that required subsequent amendments. Instead, the member of PB Council from the public<sup>128</sup> believed that the PB situation mostly depended on persons guiding the process and PB vision that is either an instrument to involve people in decision making or a channel to distribute the same funds. In his opinion, Kramatorsk's situation is somewhere in the middle. He also told that because of a conflict Kramatorsk PB gained 2 webpages. Besides, he highlighted the insufficiency of PB popularization and officials' communication with the project authors, even though authors are not always willing to participate in Council meetings, the city lacks a strong civil society that would seek to solve problems. Another PB Council member from the public<sup>129</sup> admitted that it is difficult to collaborate with municipality agencies because the officials are inert. He also noted the incertitude of municipality officials and the low activity of the city residents.

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123 Oleh Kucherov ("Active Community" in Kramatorsk City), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 27 August 2019.

124 Andrii Romanenko (Act-Kramatorsk), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

125 Oleh Kucherov ("Active Community" in Kramatorsk City), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 27 August 2019.

126 Yuliia Leonova (Kramatorsk City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

127 Yuliia Leonova (Kramatorsk City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

128 Oleh Kucherov ("Active Community" in Kramatorsk City), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 27 August 2019.

129 Andrii Romanenko (Act-Kramatorsk), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

## 3.3 Thousand-person communities

### Muzykivka AH

According to Decentralization data, in 2019, Muzykivka AH (in the Bilozerka rayon of Kherson oblast) has over 3,500 inhabitants. PB in Muzykivka AH was introduced in December 2017. Since then by July 2019 it has 1 full cycle implemented. In the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, 26.2% of all AH population voted for PB projects.

In 2018 in Muzykivka AH 5 projects received 100% of the requested funding and another 4 projects—30% of the requested funding that totaled 118,850 UAH. The majority of the projects were related to education. This corresponds to one of the operational objectives of the 2<sup>nd</sup> strategic strand of Muzykivka AH development strategy.<sup>130</sup>

A local official<sup>131</sup> described the community activism as follows: the first year demonstrated a very high voting rate, even inactive population voted, later in half of the projects the main duties of finding contractors were performed by project authors themselves, only in another half of projects public officials assisted project authors, and some authors raised external funding for their projects. Moreover, she noted that all active people are either cooped into the PB working group or become project authors; when the local authority identifies an active person, it hires him or her. The high participation rate in voting is confirmed by a project author<sup>132</sup>: “26% is realistic. I am a reputable person. I know parents, grandparents, neighbors, and other people. In particular, I organized meetings in the kindergarten.” She told that engagement starts from such activists, and then others join; they would even make a special trip from Kherson to vote over the weekend and report her with text messages upon voting. The high rate of community activism is corroborated by statistical data that indicates 26.2% of voters share in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle. An international volunteer<sup>133</sup> added that PB generates tangible results, and locals can see how they have impacted the community. In particular, community spaces emerge, where children can play and families can go together. Indeed, in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, all 100% of winning projects were completed. Moreover, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle, even more projects were submitted. The project author<sup>134</sup> explained PB impact in the following way: “PB is not an abstract idea, it is tangible—people observed that it works, and everybody knows that the authors volunteer; after purchasing an audio system for school we started to organize much more events, after renovating the stadium many young people started to play football, and many spectators come.” She gave an impressive example: before the renovation, everybody in the village would tie a cow on the stadium because there was grass, but now, after the renovation, nobody ties cows on the stadium but aside—this is how people’s conscience enhanced.

Regarding the impact of PB on local self-governance, the international volunteer<sup>135</sup> noted that the village council has undergone internal changes, which really help the whole community.

The success of PB should probably be credited to the result-oriented approach, previous community’s experience in other projects and in uniting to an AH. As the local official<sup>136</sup> explained, together with PB, there is the DOBRE program, this, it is difficult to assess the difference before and after the uniting in the AH, for even before the amalgamation and PB, the community was very active and regularly applied to

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130 Muzykivka Village AH. (n.d.). Stratehiya rozvytku Muzykivskoyi obyednanoyi hromady na 2017-2025 [The strategy of Muzykivka AH development for 2017-2025]. Retrieved from: <https://muzykivskaotg.gov.ua/storage/documents/attachments/163c3b8f03f39eff26d796f94413b6c4.pdf>

131 Liudmyla Pohribna (Muzykivka Village Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

132 Valentyna Mykhailova (NGO “Muzychany”), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

133 Ashley Garcia (Muzykivka), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

134 Valentyna Mykhailova (NGO “Muzychany”), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

135 Ashley Garcia (Muzykivka), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

136 Liudmyla Pohribna (Muzykivka Village Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.



all possible projects. Also, she remarked the absence of a budget-generating enterprise or any tax-generating business in the community, so it was up to the village council and active people to change the situation for better. She is sure that if one envisages a goal and imagines possible solutions, one can find people, activists, and volunteers, and she adds that authors are active people in everything. It should be noted that in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, the planned amount of PB funding was 100,000 UAH, so each winning project could not exceed 20,000 UAH and PB scale was small. The international volunteer<sup>137</sup> shared her observations that PB development was due to strong partnerships between international programs, the local council, and active citizens for the same goal of improving the lives of local residents and also involving them into the civic engagement programs.

## Khmilnyk

According to SSSU data, since January 2019 Khmilnyk city (the rayon center of the Vinnytsia oblast) has over 25,000 inhabitants. PB in Khmilnyk was introduced in June 2017. As of July 2019, a full 1 cycle was implemented. In the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, 4.4% of the total city population voted for PB projects.

In 2017 and 2018, Khmilnyk had 5 winning projects worth 947,799 UAH and 909,185 UAH respectively. In both cycles, the priority theme was improving utilities. This corresponds with the operational objective of the 3<sup>rd</sup> strategic priority of Khmilnyk's sustainable development strategy.<sup>138</sup>

Regarding PB impact on local residents, a projects author<sup>139</sup> noted positive results, which she liked: people were engaged, there was a competition, and now more people know about PB and want to win; some applications were submitted by people who were never active before; the possibility to collect signatures for 3 projects simultaneously unites teams. Yet, she admitted negative points too: Facebook discussions brought some critique about the prevalence of project advertising; not all willing to vote do come to CAS, moreover, not everybody knows what CAS is. Indeed, the voting statistics evidence that less than 4.4% of Khmilnyk residents vote. The municipality representative<sup>140</sup> noted that the project selection commission is half comprised of the authorities and half by the public, and municipality invited the most active and interested in city affairs to join the commission—the most publicly visible persons. She also told that during the previous years people observed that some projects have been completed and started to wish to change something in their neighborhood or in the city overall, so they started to submit more projects. Speaking of authors' influence, she recalled that one author was dissatisfied that the contract gained project elements different from its original design, and he discussed this with implementing agencies so that they revised ToR according to the author's vision. Statistical data confirms that in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, all 100% of winning projects were completed and the number of submitted projects increases annually.

Concerning the PB impact on local self-governance, the municipality representative<sup>141</sup> shared her impression that it is difficult to conduct PB, especially for implementing agencies that complain about excessive extra duties. The project author<sup>142</sup> told about her challenging experience: the first project was not passed for voting due to disputes over land where interests of influential people crossed; the second project about bicycle parking lots won, but there were controversies about installing sites, so she had to negotiate, and the outcomes were uneven because in some cases the parking lots were installed not in the designed places, and in other cases the installed parking lots were of low quality. She concluded that

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137 Ashley Garcia (Muzykivka), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

138 Khmilnyk. (2014). *Stratehiya stiykoho rozvytku m. Khmilnyka do 2020 roku* [The strategy of Khmilnyk city sustainable development by 2020]. Retrieved from: <http://hmlnyk.osp-ua.info/userfiles/file/2014/10%20%202014/3110/1/Strategiya.doc>

139 Tetiana Shevchuk (Khmilnyk City Center for Social Services), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

140 Nataliya Melnyk (Khmilnyk City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

141 Nataliya Melnyk (Khmilnyk City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

142 Tetiana Shevchuk (Khmilnyk City Center for Social Services), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

because of this community formed a negative opinion about this project.

Reflecting about the causes of PB implementation in the city, the public official<sup>143</sup> expressed a view that it is difficult to realize projects because a municipal agency writes one thing, authors write a different one, and later implementers say that such project is impossible to realize; also, many things are miscalculated at the planning stage, therefore, a project price frequently increases; because of this sometimes community residents finish up projects with their own resources. Besides, she thinks that the voting rate reflects the scale—a small issue of a city neighborhood, not a nation-wide issue like elections to the parliament.

## Chortkiv

According to SSSU data, since January 2019 Chortkiv city (the city of regional importance in Ternopil oblast) has over 25,000 inhabitants. PB in Chortkiv was introduced in December 2016. Since then, as of July 2019, 1 full cycle was implemented. In the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle, 0.2% of the total city population voted for PB projects.

In Chortkiv, in 2017, there were 2 winning projects, in 2018—6 winning projects, and in 2019—5 winning projects. Most of the projects favor community development. This complies with the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> strategic goals.<sup>144</sup>

The member of the PB working group<sup>145</sup> noted that some completed projects—an inclusive playground and a sensor room—improved the life of children and residents with disabilities.

According to reflections of the member of the PB working group from the public,<sup>146</sup> people live in very difficult times, so they are not able or not so active to vote, yet, after the introduction of ATM voting, citizens became more active and started to submit many projects. The local official<sup>147</sup> described the change in voting rates as follows: unfortunately, the first PB year did not go well—either people did not understand it or the informing was insufficient; but this was discussed later and the situation was improved; later, when the limitations for education projects were introduced, the number of projects decreased. Indeed, according to statistical data, the share of voters of the total population was as low as 0.2% in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle but increased to almost 10% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle and decreased to 6.6% in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle. The number of submitted projects oscillated too—from 4 in the 1<sup>st</sup> cycle to 30 in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle and 23 in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle. Another local official<sup>148</sup> noted that the residents met the realization of the first projects with delight—they saw a tangible reality, not merely a vote. She further posited that PB is an excellent instrument for community development that advances the community and the emergence of new ideas in it. She observed that people created Facebook groups for projects, discussed local problems on the streets, planned PB projects submission, and agitated for voting—overall, they mobilized for action.

Concerning the interaction between authorities and citizens, the local official<sup>149</sup> stated that despite the openness of authorities, the expected support was not received, for not all project authors engage in

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143 Nataliya Melnyk (Khmilnyk City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 29 August 2019.

144 Chortkiv. (2019). *Strategichniy plan rozvytku Chortkivskoyi miskoyi rady Ternopilskoyi oblasti na 2019-2026* [The strategic plan for the development of the Chortkiv city council of Ternopil oblast for 2019-2026]. Retrieved from: [https://www.chortkivmr.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Dlya\\_zatverdzhennya\\_Strategichnyj\\_plan\\_rozvytku\\_CHortkivs\\_koi\\_mis\\_koi\\_rady\\_na\\_2019-2026\\_rr\\_04.02.19.pdf](https://www.chortkivmr.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Dlya_zatverdzhennya_Strategichnyj_plan_rozvytku_CHortkivs_koi_mis_koi_rady_na_2019-2026_rr_04.02.19.pdf)

145 Halyna Kutsa (Chortkiv), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

146 Halyna Kutsa (Chortkiv), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

147 Julia Demkovich (Chortkiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

148 Mariia Bezushko (Chortkiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 9 September 2019.

149 Julia Demkovich (Chortkiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

project realization. According to another public official,<sup>150</sup> the municipality was not enthusiastic about PB at first because of new procedures, tasks, and activities—it was a challenge, and some officials perceived PB as an extra, maybe even redundant, duty. She added that it was difficult to communicate PB to municipal agencies, because the implementation process was not organized well, yet, project authors directly participate in project realization and closely interact with implementing agencies. As for project realization, she admitted the related problems of changing prices, budgeting inaccuracies, and realizing projects.

Reflecting on the causes of low voting and submission rates, the member of the PB working group from the public<sup>151</sup> pointed out that project advertising is insufficient. Moreover, the local official<sup>152</sup> indicated that the city lacks civil society organizations and active people, while project authors lack knowledge. In her opinion, because of this most projects are submitted by kindergartens, schools, and cultural institutions—those related to municipality. Another public official<sup>153</sup> admitted that people are desperate; there is a huge distrust of the authorities, and it is difficult for people to organize even a condominium association.

## Final considerations

Finally, it should be noted that PB situation in each community might depend on fundamental attitudes of the authorities and the public. However, there is a lack of sociological studies of beliefs of LSGs' officials, at least of the LSGs examined above. Instead, there are sociological surveys representative for residents of some cities—these are considered below.

The analysis of such sociological survey data<sup>154</sup> demonstrates that the public opinion of city residents does not always correspond with PB voting rates. In particular, the data of 2016-2018 municipal surveys<sup>155</sup> in Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv, and Zaporizhzhia illuminates that the opinions of the townspeople about local authorities (the assessment of city affairs, the satisfaction with the activities of the municipality and the mayor, the assessment of officials' treatment of local residents, the assessment of the opportunities to involve in municipal decision making, and the assessment of how authorities facilitate citizen participation in decision making) are not always related to PB voting rates.<sup>156</sup>

On the contrary, the 2016 survey,<sup>157</sup> conducted before PB introduction in Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv, and Zaporizhzhia, demonstrates that in these cities the shares of the townspeople with proactive attitudes (for whom democracy is more valuable than affluence, for whom citizen participation in policy decision making is very important, and who are willing to volunteer developing inputs for the city council) are most associated with the shares of voters for PB projects to be realized by the end of 2018.<sup>158</sup>

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150 Mariia Bezushko (Chortkiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 9 September 2019.

151 Halyna Kutsa (Chortkiv), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 6 September 2019.

152 Mariia Bezushko (Chortkiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 9 September 2019.

153 Julia Demkovich (Chortkiv City Council), interview with the participatory budgeting researcher, online, 30 August 2019.

154 The surveys were conducted in 24 cities by the Rating Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican Institute. The sample was comprised of 800 interviews in each city. It is representative for the 18 years and older adult population of these cities by age and gender.

155 IRI. (2018). Fourth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: [https://www.iri.org.ua/sites/default/files/editor-files/municipal\\_poll\\_2018\\_ua.pdf](https://www.iri.org.ua/sites/default/files/editor-files/municipal_poll_2018_ua.pdf)

156 At least, if one compares the rankings of cities in public opinion ratings with the ranking in the list of the percentage of voters for PB projects. One should bear in mind that 5 cities are insufficient for formal correlation analysis, so these regularities are hypothetical.

157 IRI. (2016). Ukrainian Municipal Survey. Kyiv: Author. Retrieved from: [http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/municipal\\_poll\\_2016\\_-\\_public\\_release.pdf](http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/municipal_poll_2016_-_public_release.pdf)

158 This is evident from the comparison of the rankings of cities in public opinion ratings with the ranking in the list of the percentage of voters for PB projects. Again, 5 cities are insufficient for formal correlation analysis, so these regularities are hypothetical.

**Probably, in these cities, the level of popular engagement in PB process is determined not so much by a general public opinion about city affairs or authorities but the values of the most active local residents on the importance of participation overall and personal participation in particular.**

## 4. Conclusions and recommendations

### 4.1 Conclusions

The research has provided grounds for subsequent findings.

- **In each cycle, many communities adapt the PB format, thereby employing experimental democracy.** Thus, there is a notable tendency of increasing PB cycle length. Also, there is the trend of digitizing voting format. There are cases of introducing quotas for different types of authors or project themes, of limiting council delegates' participation, of project pre-expertise, and of winning projects ranking formulae.
- **PB format is quite democratic.** So far, no community with the deliberative model of PB was identified, only two communities apply a consensus model, and almost all reviewed communities apply a social-entrepreneurship model. Yet, at the expertise or appeal stages, some communities practice expertocracy or a representative democracy, and at the stage of citizens' voting for projects, almost all communities embody direct democracy.
- **Probably, because of the lack of regular community assemblies for deliberation of development priorities, a number of expected PB effects were not identified.** In particular, the increase of social cohesion in a community and the strengthening of the positive sense of community belonging were not found. The cases of the increase of social equality in the community and of social justice are hypothetical. The involvement of diverse social groups, including politically marginalized ones, into public activities, was relatively minor.
- **Still, at least in some communities, PB brings positive outcomes.** The quality of life in the areas of security, utilities, roads, transport, environment, culture, tourism, sports, public health, social security, education, information technologies, civil society, public space, and others improves. Impact on residents is remarkable: community activism increases, civic education runs, citizens are empowered. Finally, there is a noticeable impact on local self-governance: the capacities of local officials, the interaction between the public and the authorities, the quality of democracy, and the quality and the efficiency of local self-governance improve.
- **The trajectory of PB development in a particular community mostly depends on the activism of the public and on the readiness of the authorities to introduce a genuinely participatory and efficient PB model.** If a community is active, the authorities are cooperation-oriented and have developed a productive communication, PB gains all expected outcomes. If community activism, authorities' openness, and a productive dialogue are lacking, PB can reflect the worsening in community affairs. In intermediate cases, when a certain component is missing or PB coordinators at the authorities change, positive effects might be limited or provisional.

### 4.2 Recommendations

The identified challenges and successes of PB implementation make it reasonable to recommend the following.

- During the development and amendment of PB regulations, it is advisable to involve all stakeholders from the public and the authorities, as well as invite independent experts for training and facilitation.
- To unite and develop the community as a whole, it is useful to introduce the deliberative model of PB. According to the model, at first, residents define community development priorities, and then they develop projects within these priority themes or vote for them if necessary.

- To empower citizens, maximum direct participation opportunities should be institutionalized. These may include voting for projects, elections of commission members, and project realization control.
- With the aim of wide citizen engagement, regular large-scale communication campaigns are required.
- For greater inclusiveness, multiple inclusion-oriented initiatives for diverse social groups are needed.
- The institutional capacity of authorities should be enhanced by training and special PB employee allocation.
- All PB stages should be transparent and conducted online, including voting.
- To ensure accountability, it is advisable to introduce the conflict of interest check, monthly public reports about realization progress, the responsibility for a delay, low-quality realization, or a failure of project realization.
- With the aim of efficient PB implementation it is reasonable to anticipate a long cycle. For instance, project deliberation and voting can be in one budget year, while project realization—in the subsequent one.
- To maintain trust, consistent PB implementation rules should be pursued during the whole cycle.
- Finally, it is advised to increase PB funding share of community budgets and introduce a genuinely nation-wide PB.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1. Participatory budgeting impact model and research hypotheses

Participatory budgeting impact areas	Participatory budgeting impact categories	Research hypotheses regarding participatory budgeting impact
Impact on the quality of life	Security	Public security increases
	Utilities	Utilities improve
	Roads, transport	Transport infrastructure improves
	Environment	Local environmental situation becomes better
	Culture, tourism	Leisure opportunities increase
	Sport	Sports opportunities expand
	Public health	Public health improves
	Social security	Social security increases
	Education	Education improves
	Information technologies	Information technologies advance
	Civil society	Civil society strengthens
	Public space	Public space develops
	Other	Quality of life in other spheres improves
Impact on local residents	Community activism	People become more motivated to contribute to community activities
		People are more engaged in community life
		New community leaders emerge
		Cooperation among local residents increases
	Inclusiveness	Diverse social groups are more involved in public activities
		Politically marginalized social groups are more involved in public activities
	Civic education	People understand local self-governance better People improve their social activity skills
	Empowerment	Local residents are empowered
		Decision-making authority is decentralized to citizens
		Local residents are represented in local authorities
Citizens elect participatory budgeting representatives to local authorities		
Social cohesion	Social cohesion increases A positive sense of community belonging strengthens	

Impact on local self-governance	Capacities of local officials	Politicians experience a positive conscience change
		Professional competences of local officials improve
	Interaction between the public and the authorities	The power balance shifts from individual bureaucrats to all stakeholders
		The communication between citizens and authorities improves
		The level of understanding between citizens and authorities increases
		Trust between citizens and authorities increases
		Collaboration between citizens and authorities increases
	Quality of democracy	Collaboration between citizens and authorities becomes more efficient
		The scale of civic participation increases
		The sphere of civic participation expands
		The domain of direct democracy extends
		Procedural transparency increases
	Quality of local self-governance	Social justice increases
		Local officials receive new responsibilities
		The transparency of local authorities increases
The accountability of local authorities increases		
The efficiency of local self-governance	Local self-governance reforms are initiated	
	Financial expenditures increase	
	Co-funding of projects increases	
	The use of public funds becomes more efficient	
	Public funds better reflect social needs	
	Social equality among community parts increases	

## Appendix 2. Research instruments

### Public information request (statistical data)

According to the Law of Ukraine “On Access to Public Information” hereby I request:

- 1) The date and the format of introducing participatory budgeting (further–PB) in your community (date, number, and the name of the respective legal act).
- 2) Terms of all PB cycles (dates of the start and the end of each PB implementation cycle; a full cycle includes all stages starting from the announcement of funding till the reporting on the implementation of projects).
- 3) The amounts of funding all PB cycles (the amounts of local budget funds in UAH for each PB cycle).
- 4) The amounts of local budgets for the period of PB implementation (the amounts of local budget funds in UAH for each PB year).



5) The amounts of PB co-funding (the amounts of funds in UAH allocated by the citizens, the business, NGOs, or INGOs for co-funding PB projects for each PB cycle).

6) The number of submitted projects– for each PB cycle.

7) The number of projects that have passed technical expertise and have been put for voting, of all submitted–for each PB cycle.

8) The number of winning projects which were supported (according to a popular vote or the decision of expert commission), of all which have passed technical expertise and were put for voting–for each PB cycle.

9) The number of completed projects of all winning projects, which were supported–for each PB cycle.

10) The method of defining PB winning projects (for instance, a binding popular vote, non-binding popular vote, the decision of an expert commission comprised of the members of the public, the decision of an expert commission comprised of public officials, the decision of an expert commission comprised of the members of the public and of public officials, other–please specify)–for each PB cycle.

11) Possible voting modes (for example, only electronic online, electronic online and at a CAS, electronic and paper, only paper)–for each PB cycle.

12) The number of people who voted for PB projects–for each PB cycle.

13) The number of expert commission members who voted for PB projects–for each PB cycle.

14) The number of people who delivered PB projects–for each PB cycle.

15) The number of the adult (18 years and older) population of the local community–for each PB cycle.

16) The name of an agency or agencies responsible for implementing PB.

17) The date of establishing the agency or the agencies responsible for implementing PB.

18) The number of employees whose immediate duties are to implement PB.

19) The number of employees whose duties are exclusively implementing PB, of the total number of employees whose immediate duties are to implement PB.

20) Types of communication channels and information materials utilized to inform about PB–for each PB cycle.

21) The audience covered by information materials on PB–for each PB cycle.

## **Public information request (legal acts)**

According to the Law of Ukraine “On Access to Public Information” hereby I request:

1) A copy of the legal act that introduced participatory budgeting in your community.

- 2) Copies of annual reports on implementing your community budget starting from the year of participatory budgeting introduction till 2018.
- 3) A copy of the legal act that adopted your 2019 community budget.
- 4) The list of completed participatory budgeting projects for each year, including the project funding amounts.
- 5) A copy of your community development strategy.

## **Interview guide**

- 1) Who of local self-government, local authorities, and the public took part in developing the participatory budgeting regulation?
- 2) What were the powers and the actual influence of each party?
- 3) Does the public have some power over the participatory budgeting process, for instance, due to participation in a working group or in an independent commission?
- 4) If yes, what are their powers and the actual influence?
- 5) Have there been any changes in the community due to the introduction of participatory budgeting?
- 6) If yes, which ones?
- 7) Have there been any changes in local self-governance agencies due to the introduction of participatory budgeting?
- 8) If yes, which ones?
- 9) Has any of the participatory budgeting project authors engaged in community volunteering, civic activism, or party activities due to involvement in PB?
- 10) If yes, who and where?
- 11) Has any of the participatory budgeting project authors taken an office at local self-government, local authority, or a central authority due to involvement in PB?
- 12) If yes, who and where?
- 13) In your opinion, due to which causes participatory budgeting in your community has become what it is now?
- 14) Lastly, would you like to share any opinions about the participatory budgeting experience in your community?

## Appendix 3. The list of identified communities, which have introduced participatory budgeting as of May 2019

Nº	Community name	Oblast	Community type	Hyperlink
1	Balta AH	Odesa	AH	<a href="https://balta-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://balta-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
2	Baranivka AH	Zhytomyr	AH	<a href="https://baranivka.pb.org.ua/about">https://baranivka.pb.org.ua/about</a>
3	Bakhmut	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://bahmut.pb.org.ua/">https://bahmut.pb.org.ua/</a>
4	Bashtanka	Mykolayiv	City	<a href="https://bashtanka.pb.org.ua/">https://bashtanka.pb.org.ua/</a>
5	Berdychiv	Zhytomyr	City	<a href="https://berdychiv.pb.org.ua/">https://berdychiv.pb.org.ua/</a>
6	Berdiansk	Zaporizhzhia	City	<a href="https://berdiansk.pb.org.ua/">https://berdiansk.pb.org.ua/</a>
7	Bila Tserkva	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://bc-rada.gov.ua/node/6987">https://bc-rada.gov.ua/node/6987</a>
8	Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy	Odesa	City	<a href="https://bilgorod-d.pb.org.ua/">https://bilgorod-d.pb.org.ua/</a>
9	Biloberizka AH	Ivano-Frankivsk	AH	<a href="https://biloberizka.pb.org.ua/">https://biloberizka.pb.org.ua/</a>
10	Bilozirya AH	Cherkasy	AH	<a href="https://bilozirsk-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://bilozirsk-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
11	Bobrynets	Kirovohrad	City	<a href="https://bobrynets.pb.org.ua/">https://bobrynets.pb.org.ua/</a>
12	Boyarka	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://gb.mistoboyarka.gov.ua/">https://gb.mistoboyarka.gov.ua/</a>
13	Brovary	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/brovary/in">https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/brovary/in</a>
14	Brody	Lviv	City	<a href="https://brody.pb.org.ua/register">https://brody.pb.org.ua/register</a>
15	Brusyliv AH	Zhytomyr	AH	<a href="https://brus-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://brus-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
16	Vasylkiv	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://vasylkiv.org/gromadskij-byudzhet-vasilkova/">https://vasylkiv.org/gromadskij-byudzhet-vasilkova/</a>
17	Velyki Haii AH	Ternopil	AH	<a href="https://e-dem.tools/6125281701">https://e-dem.tools/6125281701</a>
18	Velyka Severynka AH	Kirovohrad	AH	<a href="https://velykoseverynivska-silrada.gov.ua/programa-gromadskij-byudzhet/">https://velykoseverynivska-silrada.gov.ua/programa-gromadskij-byudzhet/</a>
19	Vyzhnytsia AH	Chernivtsi	AH	<a href="https://vnm-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://vnm-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
20	Vyshneve	Kyiv	City	<a href="http://bu.vyshneve-rada.gov.ua/">http://bu.vyshneve-rada.gov.ua/</a>
21	Vyshnivets AH	Ternopil	AH	<a href="http://vyshnivetska-gromada.gov.ua/budjet_uchasti/">http://vyshnivetska-gromada.gov.ua/budjet_uchasti/</a>
22	Vilnohirsk	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="https://vilnogirsk.pb.org.ua/about">https://vilnogirsk.pb.org.ua/about</a>
23	Vinnitsia	Vinnitsia	Oblast center	<a href="http://gromada.vmr.gov.ua/default.aspx">http://gromada.vmr.gov.ua/default.aspx</a>
24	Voznesensk AH	Mykolayiv	AH	<a href="https://voznensenska.pb.org.ua/">https://voznensenska.pb.org.ua/</a>
25	Voldymyr-Volynskiy	Volyn	City	<a href="https://volodymyr.pb.org.ua/about">https://volodymyr.pb.org.ua/about</a>
26	Volochysk AH	Khmelnitskyi	AH	<a href="https://volochyska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://volochyska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
27	Vuhledar	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://vugledar.pb.org.ua/">https://vugledar.pb.org.ua/</a>
28	Hlobyn rayon	Poltava	Rayon	<a href="https://globynska-gromada.gov.ua/news/1563285194/">https://globynska-gromada.gov.ua/news/1563285194/</a>
29	Horishni Plavni	Poltava	City	<a href="https://gplavni.pb.org.ua/">https://gplavni.pb.org.ua/</a>
30	Horodok	Lviv	City	<a href="https://horodok-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://horodok-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
31	Hostomel	Kyiv	Town	<a href="http://gostomel-rada.gov.ua/gromadskij-byudzhet">http://gostomel-rada.gov.ua/gromadskij-byudzhet</a>
32	Hulyaipole AH	Zaporizhzhia	AH	<a href="https://gpmrada-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://gpmrada-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
33	Dnipro	Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast center	<a href="https://adm.dniprorada.gov.ua/">https://adm.dniprorada.gov.ua/</a>
34	Dobropillia	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://dobropillya.pb.org.ua/">https://dobropillya.pb.org.ua/</a>
35	Dolyna	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	<a href="http://rada.dolyna.info/hromadska-uchast/hromadskij-byudzhet-2019/">http://rada.dolyna.info/hromadska-uchast/hromadskij-byudzhet-2019/</a>
36	Domanivka AH	Mykolayiv	AH	<a href="https://domanivka.pb.org.ua/">https://domanivka.pb.org.ua/</a>
37	Drohobych	Lviv	City	<a href="https://drohobych-rada.gov.ua/category/gromadskij-byudzhet/">https://drohobych-rada.gov.ua/category/gromadskij-byudzhet/</a>
38	Druzhkivka	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://druzhkivka.pb.org.ua/">https://druzhkivka.pb.org.ua/</a>

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39	Dubno	Rivne	City	<a href="https://dubno.pb.org.ua/">https://dubno.pb.org.ua/</a>
40	Dunayivtsi AH	Khmelnyskyi	AH	<a href="https://dunaevtsi-otg-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://dunaevtsi-otg-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
41	Enerhodar	Zaporizhzhia	City	<a href="https://en-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://en-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a> <a href="https://energy.pb.org.ua/">https://energy.pb.org.ua/</a>
42	Zhydachiv	Lviv	City	<a href="http://zhydachiv-meriya.lviv.ua/by-dzhet-mista-ta-miski-programu/gromad-skuy-bydzhet">http://zhydachiv-meriya.lviv.ua/by-dzhet-mista-ta-miski-programu/gromad-skuy-bydzhet</a>
43	Zhytomyr	Zhytomyr	Oblast center	<a href="https://zhytomyr-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://zhytomyr-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
44	Zhmerynka	Vinnytsia	City	<a href="https://zhmr.pb.org.ua/">https://zhmr.pb.org.ua/</a>
45	Zhovkva	Lviv	City	<a href="https://pb.zhovkva-rada.gov.ua/">https://pb.zhovkva-rada.gov.ua/</a>
46	Zhovti Vody	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/zhovti%20vody/in">https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/zhovti%20vody/in</a>
47	Zavodske	Poltava	City	<a href="http://zv.gov.ua/content/gromadskiy-byudzhet.html">http://zv.gov.ua/content/gromadskiy-byudzhet.html</a>
48	Zaporizhzhia	Zaporizhzhia	Oblast center	<a href="http://gb.meriazp.gov.ua/">http://gb.meriazp.gov.ua/</a>
49	Zdolbuniv	Rivne	City	<a href="https://zdolbuniv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://zdolbuniv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
50	Znamyanka	Kirovohrad	City	<a href="https://znam-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://znam-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
51	Ivano-Frankivsk	Ivano-Frankivsk	Oblast center	<a href="http://bu.mvk.if.ua/">http://bu.mvk.if.ua/</a>
52	Irpın	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://imr.gov.ua/gromadskij-byudzhet-irpin">https://imr.gov.ua/gromadskij-byudzhet-irpin</a>
53	Kalush	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	<a href="https://kalush-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://kalush-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
54	Kamyanka-Buzka rayon	Lviv	Rayon	<a href="https://kam-buz-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://kam-buz-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
55	Kamyanske	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="https://kamianske-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://kamianske-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
56	Kaniv	Cherkasy	City	<a href="https://kaniv.pb.org.ua/">https://kaniv.pb.org.ua/</a>
57	Kakhovka	Kherson	City	<a href="https://kakhovka.pb.org.ua/">https://kakhovka.pb.org.ua/</a>
58	Kyiv	Kyiv	Capitol city	<a href="https://gb.kyivcity.gov.ua/">https://gb.kyivcity.gov.ua/</a>
59	Klevan AH	Rivne	AH	<a href="https://klevan-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://klevan-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
60	Kolomyia	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	<a href="http://kolrada.gov.ua/ekonomika/">kolrada.gov.ua/ekonomika/</a>
61	Korosten	Zhytomyr	City	<a href="https://by.rada-kor.gov.ua/">https://by.rada-kor.gov.ua/</a>
62	Kramatorsk	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://kramatorsk.pb.org.ua/">https://kramatorsk.pb.org.ua/</a>
63	Kremenchuk	Poltava	City	<a href="https://kremen.pb.org.ua/">https://kremen.pb.org.ua/</a>
64	Kryvyi Rih	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="https://gb.kr.gov.ua/">https://gb.kr.gov.ua/</a>
65	Kropyvnytskyi	Kirovohrad	Oblast center	<a href="http://www.kr-rada.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet/">www.kr-rada.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet/</a>
66	Lanivtsi AH	Ternopil	AH	<a href="https://lanmisto-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://lanmisto-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
67	Lyman AH	Donetsk	AH	<a href="http://budget.krliman.gov.ua/uk">budget.krliman.gov.ua/uk</a>
68	Lityn	Vinnytsia	Town	<a href="https://lityn-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://lityn-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
69	Lutsk	Volyn	Oblast center	<a href="https://www.lutskrada.gov.ua/pages/biudzhet-uchasti">https://www.lutskrada.gov.ua/pages/biudzhet-uchasti</a>
70	Lviv	Lviv	Oblast center	<a href="https://lviv.pb.org.ua/">https://lviv.pb.org.ua/</a>
71	Liubar AH	Zhytomyr	AH	<a href="https://lubar-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://lubar-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
72	Marhanets	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/marhanets/in">https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/marhanets/in</a>
73	Mariupol	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://mariupolrada.gov.ua/page/bjudzhet-gromadskoi-uchasti">https://mariupolrada.gov.ua/page/bjudzhet-gromadskoi-uchasti</a>
74	Melitopol	Zaporizhzhia	City	<a href="https://melitopol-online.gov.ua/">https://melitopol-online.gov.ua/</a>
75	Merefa AH	Kharkiv	AH	<a href="https://merefa.pb.org.ua/">https://merefa.pb.org.ua/</a>
76	Mykolayiv	Mykolayiv	City	<a href="https://mykolaiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://mykolaiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
77	Mykulyntsi AH	Ternopil	AH	<a href="https://mykulynecka.pb.org.ua/">https://mykulynecka.pb.org.ua/</a>

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78	Myrhorod	Poltava	City	<a href="http://myrgorod.pl.ua/page/gromadskiy-bjudzhet/gromadskiy-bjudzhet">http://myrgorod.pl.ua/page/gromadskiy-bjudzhet/gromadskiy-bjudzhet</a>
79	Mohyliv AH	Dnipropetrovsk	AH	<a href="https://mogyliv.pb.org.ua/">https://mogyliv.pb.org.ua/</a>
80	Muzykivka AH	Kherson	AH	<a href="https://muzykivka.pb.org.ua/">https://muzykivka.pb.org.ua/</a>
81	Mukachevo	Zakarpattia	City	<a href="https://www.mukachevo-rada.gov.ua/index.php/.../biudzhet-hromadskykh-init-siaty">https://www.mukachevo-rada.gov.ua/index.php/.../biudzhet-hromadskykh-init-siaty</a>
82	Nadvirna	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	<a href="https://nadvirna-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://nadvirna-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
83	Nemishayeve	Kyiv	Town	<a href="https://nem-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://nem-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
84	Netishyn	Khmelnitskyi	City	<a href="https://www.netishynrada.gov.ua/gr-budget/">https://www.netishynrada.gov.ua/gr-budget/</a>
85	Nizhyn	Chernihiv	City	<a href="http://www.nizhynrada.gov.ua/interview/68/gromadskiy-byudjet.html">www.nizhynrada.gov.ua/interview/68/gromadskiy-byudjet.html</a>
86	Nikopol	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="https://nikopol-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://nikopol-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
87	Nova Vodolaha AH	Kharkiv	AH	<a href="https://vodolaha-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://vodolaha-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
88	Novohrad-Volynskyi	Zhytomyr	City	<a href="https://novograd-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://novograd-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
89	Novpskov AH	Luhansk	AH	<a href="https://novopskovrada.gov.ua/bjudzhet-uchasti-16-06-54-02-11-2016/">https://novopskovrada.gov.ua/bjudzhet-uchasti-16-06-54-02-11-2016/</a>
90	Novoyavorivsk	Lviv	City	<a href="https://novoyavorivsk.pb.org.ua/">https://novoyavorivsk.pb.org.ua/</a>
91	Obukhiv	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/obukhiv/in">https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/obukhiv/in</a>
92	Odesa	Odesa	Oblast center	<a href="https://citizen.odessa.ua/projects/">https://citizen.odessa.ua/projects/</a>
93	Olevsk AH	Zhytomyr	AH	<a href="https://olevsk-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://olevsk-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
94	Okhtyrka	Sumy	City	<a href="https://okhtyrka.pb.org.ua/about">https://okhtyrka.pb.org.ua/about</a>
95	Pervomaisk	Mykolayiv	City	<a href="https://pervomaisk.pb.org.ua/">https://pervomaisk.pb.org.ua/</a>
96	Pervomaiskyi	Kharkiv	City	<a href="https://pervomaisk-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://pervomaisk-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
97	Perechyn AH	Zakarpattia	AH	<a href="http://www.perechyn.com.ua/gromadskii-biudzhet">www.perechyn.com.ua/gromadskii-biudzhet</a>
98	Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskyi	Kyiv	City	<a href="http://phm.gov.ua/?page_id=2370">http://phm.gov.ua/?page_id=2370</a>
99	Pyriatyn AH	Poltava	AH	<a href="http://bu.pyriatyn-mrada.gov.ua/">bu.pyriatyn-mrada.gov.ua/</a>
100	Pokrov	Dnipropetrovsk	City	<a href="http://pokrov.ci.org.ua/">http://pokrov.ci.org.ua/</a>
101	Pokrovske	Dnipropetrovsk	Town	<a href="https://pokrovske.pb.org.ua/">https://pokrovske.pb.org.ua/</a>
102	Polohy	Zaporizhzhia	City	<a href="https://polohy-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://polohy-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
103	Poltava	Poltava	Oblast center	<a href="http://www.rada-poltava.gov.ua/people/parcut-upator">www.rada-poltava.gov.ua/people/parcut-upator</a>
104	Poltava oblast	Poltava	Oblast	<a href="https://poltava-obl-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://poltava-obl-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
105	Prybuzhany AH	Lviv	AH	<a href="https://pribuzany.pb.org.ua/">https://pribuzany.pb.org.ua/</a>
106	Pryvilne AH	Rivne	AH	<a href="https://pryvilne-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://pryvilne-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
107	Pryluky	Chernihiv	City	<a href="https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/pryluky/in">https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/pryluky/in</a>
108	Prymorsk AH	Zaporizhzhia	AH	<a href="http://www.mrprim.zp.ua/?page_id=2649">www.mrprim.zp.ua/?page_id=2649</a>
109	Rivne	Rivne	Oblast center	<a href="https://rivne.pb.org.ua/">https://rivne.pb.org.ua/</a>
110	Rohan AH	Kharkiv	AH	<a href="https://rogan.pb.org.ua/">https://rogan.pb.org.ua/</a>
111	Romny	Sumy	City	<a href="http://romny.osp-ua.info/?ch=3&amp;fl=mbudj_hb">romny.osp-ua.info/?ch=3&amp;fl=mbudj_hb</a>
112	Rudky AH	Lviv	AH	<a href="https://rudkivska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://rudkivska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
113	Sambir	Lviv	City	<a href="https://sambircity.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet/">https://sambircity.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet/</a>
114	Svitlovodsk	Kirovohrad	City	<a href="http://svmisto.com.ua/grom_budget/">svmisto.com.ua/grom_budget/</a>
115	Severodonetsk	Luhansk	City	<a href="http://sed-rada.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet">sed-rada.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet</a>
116	Slavske AH	Lviv	AH	<a href="https://slavska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://slavska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
117	Slavutych	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://slavutych.pb.org.ua/">https://slavutych.pb.org.ua/</a>

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118	Slavuta AH	Khmelnyskyi	AH	<a href="https://slavuta-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://slavuta-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
119	Slobozhanske AH	Dnipropetrovsk	AH	<a href="https://slobozhanske.pb.org.ua/">https://slobozhanske.pb.org.ua/</a>
120	Sloviansk	Donetsk	City	<a href="https://slov-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://slov-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
121	Smila	Cherkasy	City	<a href="http://www.smila-rada.gov.ua/gromadskiy-bjudzhet">www.smila-rada.gov.ua/gromadskiy-bjudzhet</a>
122	Snovsk AH	Chernihiv	AH	<a href="http://snovmr.gov.ua/cat/gromadskiy-byudzhet/">snovmr.gov.ua/cat/gromadskiy-byudzhet/</a>
123	Sosnytsia AH	Chernihiv	AH	<a href="http://sosnitsa-otg.ci.org.ua/">sosnitsa-otg.ci.org.ua/</a>
124	Stari Bohorodchany AH	Ivano-Frankivsk	AH	<a href="https://staribogorodchany.pb.org.ua/">https://staribogorodchany.pb.org.ua/</a>
125	Staryi Saltiv AH	Kharkiv	AH	<a href="https://staryisaltiv.pb.org.ua/">https://staryisaltiv.pb.org.ua/</a>
126	Stepanivka AH	Sumy	AH	<a href="https://stepanivska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://stepanivska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
127	Sumy	Sumy	Oblast center	<a href="https://sumy.pb.org.ua/">https://sumy.pb.org.ua/</a>
128	Talalaivka AH	Chernihiv	AH	<a href="https://talgromada-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://talgromada-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
129	Terebovlia AH	Ternopil	AH	<a href="https://terebovlya.pb.org.ua/">https://terebovlya.pb.org.ua/</a>
130	Ternopil	Ternopil	Oblast center	<a href="https://pb.rada.te.ua/">https://pb.rada.te.ua/</a>
131	Tetiyiv	Kyiv	City	<a href="http://tetiivmiskrada.gov.ua/uchast-gromadi/gromadskij-byudzhet/">tetiivmiskrada.gov.ua/uchast-gromadi/gromadskij-byudzhet/</a>
132	Trostanets	Sumy	City	<a href="http://trostyanets-miskrada.gov.ua/viewpage.php?page_id=473">trostyanets-miskrada.gov.ua/viewpage.php?page_id=473</a>
133	Truskavets	Lviv	City	<a href="http://www.tmr.gov.ua/dovidka/hromadskiy-biudzhet">www.tmr.gov.ua/dovidka/hromadskiy-biudzhet</a>
134	Tulchyn	Vinnytsia	City	<a href="https://e-dem.tools/0524310100">https://e-dem.tools/0524310100</a>
135	Tyachiv AH	Zakarpattia	AH	<a href="https://tyachiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://tyachiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
136	Uzhhorod	Zakarpattia	Oblast center	<a href="https://rada-uzhgorod.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet-2/">https://rada-uzhgorod.gov.ua/gromadskiy-byudzhet-2/</a>
137	Fastiv	Kyiv	City	<a href="https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/fastiv/in">https://initiativ.e-dem.in.ua/fastiv/in</a>
138	Kharkiv	Kharkiv	Oblast center	<a href="http://www.city.kharkov.ua/.../pro-zatverdzhennya-miskoi-tsilovoi-programi-gromadskiy-b...">www.city.kharkov.ua/.../pro-zatverdzhennya-miskoi-tsilovoi-programi-gromadskiy-b...</a>
139	Khmelnyskyi	Khmelnyskyi	Oblast center	<a href="https://gp.khm.gov.ua/">https://gp.khm.gov.ua/</a>
140	Khmilnyk	Vinnytsia	City	<a href="https://hmilnyk.pb.org.ua/">https://hmilnyk.pb.org.ua/</a>
141	Tsarychanka	Dnipropetrovsk	Town	<a href="https://tsarichanka.pb.org.ua/">https://tsarichanka.pb.org.ua/</a>
142	Chervonohrad	Lviv	City	<a href="https://chervonograd.pb.org.ua/">https://chervonograd.pb.org.ua/</a>
143	Cherkasy	Cherkasy	Oblast center	<a href="http://chmr.gov.ua/ua/sections.php?s=34">chmr.gov.ua/ua/sections.php?s=34</a>
144	Chernivtsi	Chernivtsi	Oblast center	<a href="https://gb.city.cv.ua/">https://gb.city.cv.ua/</a>
145	Chernihiv	Chernihiv	Oblast center	<a href="https://chernihiv.pb.org.ua/">https://chernihiv.pb.org.ua/</a>
146	Chornomorsk	Odesa	City	<a href="https://cmr.pb.org.ua/">https://cmr.pb.org.ua/</a>
147	Chortkiv	Ternopil	City	<a href="https://chortkiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/">https://chortkiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/</a>
148	Chuhuyiv	Kharkiv	City	<a href="https://chuhuyiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://chuhuyiv-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
149	Shepetivka	Khmelnyskyi	City	<a href="https://shepetivka.pb.org.ua/">https://shepetivka.pb.org.ua/</a>
150	Shyroka AH	Zaporizhzhia	AH	<a href="https://shyroka-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://shyroka-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
151	Shostka	Sumy	City	<a href="https://shostka.pb.org.ua/">https://shostka.pb.org.ua/</a>
152	Shumsk AH	Ternopil	AH	<a href="https://shumska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://shumska-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>
153	Yavoriv	Lviv	City	<a href="https://yavoriv.pb.org.ua/">https://yavoriv.pb.org.ua/</a>
154	Yaremche	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	<a href="https://yaremche-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/">https://yaremche-budget.e-dem.in.ua/#/</a>

## Appendix 4. The list of communities with voting data for participatory budgeting projects implemented in 2018

Community name	Oblast	Community type	Voters per-centage	Community size
Kyiv	Kyiv	Capitol city	4.4930%	Over 1,000,000
Dnipro	Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast center	3.1901%	Over 1,000,000
Odesa	Odesa	Oblast center	2.7845%	Over 1,000,000
Lviv	Lviv	Oblast center	9.8989%	Over 100,000
Kryvyi Rih	Dnipropetrovsk	City	8.9961%	Over 100,000
Severodonetsk	Luhansk	City	7.8141%	Over 100,000
Cherkasy	Cherkasy	Oblast center	7.5969%	Over 100,000
Sumy	Sumy	Oblast center	7.2362%	Over 100,000
Chernihiv	Chernihiv	Oblast center	5.6830%	Over 100,000
Kropyvnytskyi	Kirovohrad	Oblast center	5.4402%	Over 100,000
Melitopol	Zaporizhzhia	City	4.6570%	Over 100,000
Berdyansk	Zaporizhzhia	City	4.5493%	Over 100,000
Khmelnyskyi	Khmelnyskyi	Oblast center	4.0720%	Over 100,000
Mykolayiv	Mykolayiv	City	3.7499%	Over 100,000
Zaporizhzhia	Zaporizhzhia	Oblast center	3.4501%	Over 100,000
Kremenchuk	Poltava	City	3.4369%	Over 100,000
Zhytomyr	Zhytomyr	Oblast center	3.2450%	Over 100,000
Chernivtsi	Chernivtsi	Oblast center	2.9441%	Over 100,000
Brovary	Kyiv	City	2.8578%	Over 100,000
Bila Tserkva	Kyiv	City	2.6128%	Over 100,000
Poltava	Poltava	Oblast center	2.6110%	Over 100,000
Ternopil	Ternopil	Oblast center	2.5049%	Over 100,000
Rivne	Rivne	Oblast center	2.1617%	Over 100,000
Uzhhorod	Zakarpattia	Oblast center	2.1536%	Over 100,000
Kamyanske	Dnipropetrovsk	City	1.6412%	Over 100,000
Kramatorsk	Donetsk	City	0.5818%	Over 100,000
Muzykivka AH	Kherson	AH	26.2105%	Over 1,000
Tsarychanka	Dnipropetrovsk	Town	22.9939%	Over 1,000
Bashtanka	Mykolayiv	City	21.5894%	Over 1,000
Slavutych	Kyiv	City	15.8148%	Over 1,000
Zhovkva	Lviv	City	11.6525%	Over 1,000
Yavoriv	Lviv	City	11.2507%	Over 1,000
Lyman AH	Donetsk	AH	10.8418%	Over 1,000
Tetiyiv	Kyiv	City	9.8408%	Over 1,000
Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi	Odesa	City	9.3782%	Over 1,000
Okhtyrka	Sumy	City	9.3240%	Over 1,000
Velyka Severynka AH	Kirovohrad	AH	8.9645%	Over 1,000
Zhovti Vody	Dnipropetrovsk	City	8.5568%	Over 1,000
Kamyanka-Buzka rayon	Lviv	Rayon	8.4405%	Over 1,000
Myrhorod	Poltava	City	8.2100%	Over 1,000
Bakhmut	Donetsk	City	7.6156%	Over 1,000
Vilnohirsk	Dnipropetrovsk	City	7.4364%	Over 1,000

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Slavuta AH	Khmelnyskyi	AH	7.0162%	Over 1,000
Vuhledar	Donetsk	City	5.9982%	Over 1,000
Dolyna	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	5.8053%	Over 1,000
Sosnytsia AH	Chernihiv	AH	5.7226%	Over 1,000
Kalush	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	5.7052%	Over 1,000
Novoyavorivsk	Lviv	City	5.4825%	Over 1,000
Irpin	Kyiv	City	5.2088%	Over 1,000
Khmilnyk	Vinnytsia	City	4.3919%	Over 1,000
Prymorsk AH	Zaporizhzhia	AH	4.0244%	Over 1,000
Shumsk AH	Ternopil	AH	3.2746%	Over 1,000
Kolomyia	Ivano-Frankivsk	City	3.2455%	Over 1,000
Mohyliv AH	Dnipropetrovsk	AH	2.8134%	Over 1,000
Kaniv	Cherkasy	City	2.4925%	Over 1,000
Pyriatyn AH	Poltava	AH	2.4364%	Over 1,000
Truskavets	Lviv	City	2.3452%	Over 1,000
Chervonohrad	Lviv	City	2.2725%	Over 1,000
Biloberizka AH	Ivano-Frankivsk	AH	2.1716%	Over 1,000
Fastiv	Kyiv	City	2.1246%	Over 1,000
Svitlovodsk	Kirovohrad	City	2.0911%	Over 1,000
Mukachevo	Zakarpattia	City	1.8876%	Over 1,000
Bobrynets	Kirovohrad	City	1.8348%	Over 1,000
Kakhovka	Kherson	City	1.7869%	Over 1,000
Dobropillia	Donetsk	City	1.7492%	Over 1,000
Dubno	Rivne	City	1.3434%	Over 1,000
Pervomaiskyi	Kharkiv	City	1.2669%	Over 1,000
Horishni Plavni	Poltava	City	1.2241%	Over 1,000
Boyarka	Kyiv	City	1.2127%	Over 1,000
Mykulyntsi AH	Ternopil	AH	1.1669%	Over 1,000
Netishyn	Khmelnyskyi	City	1.1052%	Over 1,000
Chornomorsk	Odesa	City	0.9543%	Over 1,000
Shepetivka	Khmelnyskyi	City	0.2706%	Over 1,000
Chortkiv	Ternopil	City	0.2057%	Over 1,000



## Appendix 5. The list of the interviewed experts

Community name	Community scale	Respondent type	Respondent name	Interview type
Kyiv	Over 1,000,000 residents	Authorities	Ihor Khatsevych	Offline
		Civil society	Serhiy Loboiko	Offline
Dnipro	Over 1,000,000 residents	Authorities	Yuliia Pavliuk	Online
		Civil society	Iryna Stasiuk	Online
Odesa	Over 1,000,000 residents	Authorities	Oksana Tachkovska	Online
		Civil society	Yurii Diachenko	Online
		Civil society	Victor Yehorov	Online
Lviv	Over 100,000 residents	Authorities	Orest Faifurka	Online
		Civil society	Ivana Havrylko	Online
		Civil society	Nataliya Lipska	Online
Zaporizhzhia	Over 100,000 residents	Authorities	Vladyslav Nikolayev	Online
		Civil society	Kateryna Akula	Online
Kramatorsk	Over 100,000 residents	Authorities	Yuliia Leonova	Online
		Civil society	Oleh Kucherov	Online
		Civil society	Andrii Romanenko	Online
Muzykivka AH	Over 1,000 residents	Authorities	Liudmyla Pohribna	Online
		Civil society	Ashley Garcia	Online
		Civil society	Valentyna Mykhailova	Online
Khmilnyk	Over 1,000 residents	Authorities	Nataliya Melnyk	Online
		Civil society	Tetiana Shevchuk	Online
Chortkiv	Over 1,000 residents	Authorities	Julia Demkovich	Online
		Authorities	Mariia Bezushko	Online
		Civil society	Halyna Kutsa	Online